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ARTICLES
CLASS ACTION ACCOUNTABILITY: RECONCILING
EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY IN
REPRESENTATIVE LITIGATION
John C. Coffee, Jr.*
In two recent and highly technical decisions-Amchem Products v.
Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.-the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that a serious potential for collusion exists in class actions and has
outlined a concept of "class cohesion" as the rationale that legitimizes repre-
sentative litigation. Although agreeing that a legitimacy principle is needed,
Professor Coffee doubts that "class cohesion" can bear that weight, either as a
normative theory of representation or as an economic solution for the agency
cost and collective action problems that arise in representative litigation. He
warns that an expansive interpretation of "class cohesion" could produce a
"Balkanization" of the class action that would impair its utility. The guid-
ing normative principle in class action reform, he suggests, should be the
protection and enhancement of client autonomy, not "class cohesion," be-
cause the class action for money damages is ultimately more an aggregation
of individuals than a distinct entity.
Viewing class action accountability as at bottom a governance issue,
Professor Coffee considers the relevance of corporate control mechanisms and
market-based remedies that have worked in other contexts to limit agent op-
portunism. In particular, he concludes that a strategy of enhancing "exit"
should outperform alternative efforts aimed at improving either client "voice"
or agent "loyalty, " and suggests that "exit" could in some circumstances be a
superior functional substitute for class cohesion.
INTRODUCTION
A transitory, but overdue, moment has arisen in which to rethink the
role and scope of the class action. This brief moment arises primarily
because of recent Supreme Court decisions whose scope has yet to be
resolved, but it is overdue in large part because the academic literature
on class actions (and complex litigation generally) has neglected to ask
some basic questions. Chief among these is: How can we hold class coun-
sel accountable to the class members that the attorney has elected to rep-
resent-without imposing constraints on the class action that threaten its
viability? The premise to this Article is that a feasible answer to this ques-
tion requires that we look outside the boundaries of the Federal Rules of
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. The author is
particularly indebted to his colleagues, Professors Samuel Issacharoff, Henry Monaghan,
and Susan Sturm for their thoughtful comments and has benefited from a continuing
dialogue with them.
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Civil Procedure (or the existing academic literature on civil procedure)
and view the class action as an organizational form that has become dys-
functional because the principals cannot effectively monitor their agent.
Effective monitoring requires in turn that we rethink the governance
structure of this organizational form. In particular, meaningful reform
requires that we consider market-based remedies and checking mecha-
nisms that have worked in related contexts to align the interests of the
principal and the agent.
That this question is timely is shown by the dramatic shift in atti-
tudes-both popular and academic-toward the class action. Where
once it was seen as the plaintiffs sword, it is now increasingly recognized
that it can be the defendant's shield.' Where once it was viewed as em-
powering class members, increasingly it is seen as entrapping them.2 Cor-
respondingly, where the plaintiffs' attorney was once seen as a public-
regarding private attorney general, increasingly the more standard depic-
tion is as a profit-seeking entrepreneur, capable of opportunistic actions
1. I have no doubt contributed to this depiction and continue to view it as a serious
problem. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343 (1995); see also Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak
of Settlement, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1051 (1996) (noting prevalence of collusive settlements);
John Leubsdorf, Co-opting the Class Action, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1222 (1995) (analyzing
how defendants can manipulate class actions). The empirical literature on class action
practices is relatively modest, but tends to corroborate the critique that I have advanced.
In 1999, the RAND Institute for Civil Justice conducted an extensive case study of recent
class actions and summarized the accountability problem in terms that should surprise no
one familiar with the prior academic literature:
Such "clientless litigation" holds within itself the seeds for questionable practices.
The powerful financial incentives that drive plaintiff attorneys to assume the risk
of litigation intersect with powerful interests on the defense side in settling
litigation as early and as cheaply as possible, with the least publicity. These
incentives can produce settlements that are arrived at without adequate
investigation of facts and law and that create little value for class members of
society. For class counsel, the rewards are fees disproportionate to the effort they
actually invested in the case. For defendants, the rewards are a less-expensive
settlement than they may have anticipated given the merits of the case .... For
society, however, there are substantial costs: lost opportunities for deterrence ... ,
wasted resources ... , and-over the long run-increasing amounts of frivolous
litigation ....
Deborah R. Hensler et al., RAND Inst. for Civ. Just., Executive Summary, Class Action
Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain 1, 10 (1999) [hereinafter, RAND
Study].
2. This entrapment results in part because the class member has no ability to opt out
from certain "mandatory" class actions, which may in fact be sponsored by the defendants.
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 805 (1997);
Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They?: Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 Cornell
L. Rev. 858 (1995); Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against
Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1148 (1998). For a further
discussion of the mandatory class action, see infra note 10. Even apart from the mandatory
class action, entrapment can result because "future claimants" in some class actions have
little incentive to object or protest until, after a long latency period, they learn for a fact
that they have been injured.
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and often willing to subordinate the interests of class members to the
attorney's own economic self-interest. 3 Nowhere has the vulnerability of
absent class members to such opportunism been more apparent than in
the context of mass tort litigation, where the majority of the class usually
consists of persons who have been exposed to a hazardous product or
substance and will not suffer any compensable injury until some distant
time in the future (if at all).4 The mass tort class action thus stands as the
paradigmatic context in which the agency costs of holding the plaintiffs'
attorney accountable to the class are likely to be the highest.
Nonetheless, distinctive as the mass tort class action may be, the dif-
ferences between it and other class actions are more a matter of degree
than of kind. Across all class action contexts, the same principal/agent
problems recur and need to be addressed in a consistent fashion. With
its recent decisions in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor5 and Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp.,6 the Supreme Court has now recognized the potential for
collusion in class action settlements. In response, viewing judicial toler-
ance of novel or expansive class action procedures that departed from
the historical model as inviting a "greater ... likelihood of abuse,"7 the
majority in Ortiz has essentially frozen the development of the class ac-
tion. Indeed, the clearest message in Ortiz is that any innovation in class
action procedures that departs from "the traditional norm" is hereafter
likely to be disfavored.8
Still, even though the Court has chilled the use of the more manipu-
lative devices by which defendants and class counsel could structure a
settlement that maximized their interests at the expense of the class
members-most notably, the "settlement class action" 9 and the "limited
3. For probably the most vehement critique of plaintiffs' attorneys as advancing their
own interests to the detriment of class members, see Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the
Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1045 (1995). The
general description of the plaintiffs' attorney as a risk-taking legal entrepreneur dates from
the mid-1980s and was intended more as a positivist analytic construct than a normative
evaluation. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1987);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum.
L. Rev. 669 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney]; Jonathan
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations For Reform, 58 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1 (1991).
4. For exhaustive treatment of this theme, see Symposium, Mass Tortes: Serving Up
Just Desserts, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 811 (1995).
5. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
6. 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
7. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2313 (1999) ("[T]he greater the leniency in departing from the
historical limited fund model, the greater the likelihood of abuse .... ").
8. Id. at 2312 ("At the least, the burden ofjustification rests on the proponent of any
departure from the traditional norm.").
9. The term "settlement class" refers to a class action that has been certified only for
purposes of settlement and not for litigation. Thus, if the case does not settle, the
[Vol. 100:370
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fund," non-opt-out class action 1 0-it has banned neither. Rather, both
Amchem and Ortiz rely more on rule formalism than due process to reach
their results. Fact-sensitive and rule-dependent decisions that shrink
from announcing any broad constitutional norms, they effectively
whisper "Rule 23 does not authorize that," rather than proclaim "Due
process forbids that." At most, the Court has warned that it holds in re-
serve an embryonic theory of "adequacy of representation," which it may
develop as a due process limitation upon the ability of class counsel to
resolve the legal rights of absent or non-consenting class members.
Ironically, this cautious, provisional approach to both "settlement
classes" and the "limited fund" class action risks two inconsistent dangers:
defendants have not conceded that the action can go to trial as a class action. Prior to
Amchem, the federal circuit courts were divided as to whether the requirements for class
certification were relaxed in the case of a settlement class action. Specifically, because
Rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that common issues of law
and fact "predominate" before a class action that is primarily for money damages can be
certified, the view of some courts that the fairness and adequacy of any proposed
settlement constituted a "predominant" issue implied that settlement classes could be
certified so long as the reviewing court considered the settlement to be fair. See, e.g., In re
Asbestos Litig. (Ahearn 1), 90 F.3d 963, 975-76 (5th Cir. 1996). The first decision to reject
this logic and insist that the settlement's adequacy did not resolve the issues relating to the
process by which it was reached was In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1995).
10. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs that the class members
must be given a right to opt out only in the case of a Rule 23(b) (3) class action (which is
the section of Rule 23 that broadly authorizes class actions for money damages). See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2). Thus, actions brought under Rule 23(b) (1) or Rule 23(b) (2) need not
permit the class member to opt out (unless a court determines that due process so
requires). In particular, Rule 23(b) (1) (B) authorizes a mandatory class if:
the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of... adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). The classic illustration would be a dispute over the assets in a
specific fund or trust because a victory by one claimant against the fund would preclude or
substantially limit recovery by other claimants. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2308-09. However,
during the 1990s, some federal courts began to view a corporation which lacked sufficient
assets to satisfy all claimants as itself a "limited fund" that could invoke Rule 23(b) (1) (B) to
achieve certification of a non-opt-out class action whose settlement would bind all
claimants. Such a device, which essentially made the class action a more attractive
alternative to bankruptcy reorganization, was particularly attractive to corporations facing
massive mass tort claims that would predictably be brought by "futures" claimants. See
Ahearn 1, 90 F.3d at 1001-02 & n.17 (Smith, J., dissenting). For criticisms of the legitimacy
of proposed extensions of Rule 23, see Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The
Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements
Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 461, 491 (1997); Monaghan, supra note
2, at 1164-65. Ortiz, of course, restricted this use of Rule 23(b) (1) (B) by finding it to be
beyond the scope of the Rule as intended by the Advisory Committee. See 119 S. Ct. at
2311-14. Until Rule 23 is amended to provide otherwise, Ortiz establishes that limited
funds created by and not pre-existing the litigation do not qualify for certification under
Rule 23(b) (1) (B). See id. at 2313-14.
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(1) it may do too little, and (2) it may do too much. The first danger
arises because fairly modest revisions to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (which authorizes the class action) could seemingly re-
store both the "settlement class" and the "limited fund" class action to
their former vitality.11 A powerful coalition of interests-defendants
seeking to economize on tort liability costs, trial judges intent on mini-
mizing individual trials, and plaintiffs' attorneys eager to receive lucrative
class action fee awards-seems intent on recapturing the ability to use
"settlement classes" and "limited fund" class actions.1 2 In short, to the
extent that Amchem and Ortiz are non-constitutional decisions, they may
provide only a temporary respite and could be outflanked by revisions to
Rule 23. Only if the concept of "adequacy of representation" can be
given a firmer constitutional grounding than either Amchem or Ortiz has
yet provided will class members gain durable due process protections
which cannot be distinguished away in the next case or trivialized
through rule revisions.
The second danger arises because an expansive reading of Amchem
and Ortiz threatens the viability of the class action across a broad range of
litigation contexts. An aggressive reading of Amchem's standards for class
certification might permit a class action to be certified only when the
class representative possesses virtually identical characteristics with the
class members who are to be represented in the action. This new strict-
ness flows from Amchem's core assertion that "class cohesion" legitimizes
the representative action and cannot be replaced simply by an ex post
judicial review of the settlement's fairness.13 But the more that "cohe-
sion" is required, the more the class must be fragmented into subclasses
with their own separate counsel. Ultimately, if any material difference in
the legal status, compensable injury, or negotiating leverage possessed by
class members were to require subclassing in order to maintain sufficient
"cohesion" among class members, the upshot would be what this Article
will term the "Balkanization" of the class action: namely, its fragmenta-
tion into a loose-knit coalition of potentially feuding enclaves that could
11. This possibility is underlined by the concurring opinion of Justice Rehnquist
(joined in by Justices Scalia and Kennedy), which expresses the view that were they
"devising a system for handling these claims on a clean slate, [they] would agree entirely
with [the] dissent." Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2323-24. When coupled with the dissent, five
justices thus appear to be hinting that the only real obstacle to "limited fund" class actions
is amendment of Rule 23.
12. The desire to restore "settlement classes" and mandatory, non-opt-out classes to a
status close to their former position comes through loud and clear in the Report of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Working Group on Mass Torts to the Chief
Justice of the United States and to the Judicial Conference of the United States. See
Federal Judicial Center, Report on Mass Tort Litigation 57 (1999). A number of proposals
for liberalized settlement and mandatory classes are discussed in this Report, but no clear
consensus appears to have crystallized as to which option is most feasible.
13. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) ("But it is not the




seldom litigate effectively as an organization. After Ortiz, the prospects
for such Balkanization are real and require a clearer definition of when
intra-class differences should be viewed as undermining representational
adequacy.
More generally, in its emphasis on class cohesion, Amchem seems to
have accepted an implicit theory of representation: A representative is
entitled to bind only those persons whose interests and legal positions
match those of the representative. Philosophers have a name for this
idea that a representative must mirror the characteristics of the represen-
tative's constituency: "descriptive representation." 14 As well-recognized
as this theory of representation is, it is remarkably inadequate when ap-
plied to the context of litigation. The initial problem is that there are
many decisions in life over which most individuals would not wish to cede
authority to an unchosen agent to act on their behalf-at least not simply
because that person bore surface similarities with them and had no dis-
cernible conflict of interest. The deeper problem lies, however, in the
fact that even an entirely unconflicted representative whose characteris-
tics correspond in every way with their own might still be an ineffective
agent. For example, such a "mirror image" agent could still be undermo-
tivated, indifferent, or uninformed-or could have very different risk
preferences than the parties that the agent is seeking to represent. De-
scriptive representation may then be a necessary condition, but it should
not be a sufficient condition, for representational adequacy.
In fairness to the Amchem majority, the problem of defining repre-
sentational adequacy is obviously complex. Furthermore it has not been
seriously addressed in the existing academic literature on litigation and
civil procedure. Put bluntly, that literature is underconceptualized, view-
ing the class action narrowly in terms of either the intent of the drafters
of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the administrative
needs ofjudges. But, as Amchem appropriately realized, a broader theory
of representation is ultimately necessary before the class action can rest
on any normatively satisfactory foundation.
On what foundation then should such a theory of representational
adequacy be based? Of course, there are multiple answers, and different
theories may apply more aptly in different contexts. Nonetheless, this
Article starts from the premise that the class action is essentially an orga-
nizational form that at bottom involves a principal/agent relationship.
14. See Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 60-91 (1967); see also
infra notes 10-39 and accompanying text. Students of civil procedure will, of course,
understand that the "typicality" requirement of Rule 23(a) (3) also requires a
correspondence between the class representative's injury and legal position and that of the
class members. See infra text accompanying notes 89-90. But, in focusing on "class
cohesion," Amchem went well beyond the typicality requirement and appears to have
insisted on a broader principle of legitimacy to justify representative litigation. This Article
agrees that a principle of legitimacy is necessary, but doubts that any concept of class
cohesion can alone bear that weight.
2000]
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From this starting point, it follows that the class members, as the princi-
pals, should be deemed to have consented to the representation only if
the agency costs associated with the relationship have been minimized.
15
Then, and only then, is the fiduciary likely to be faithful. In other con-
texts where agents who have not been expressly appointed by their clients
represent the interests of a large group of persons (for example, the cor-
porate context where officers and directors represent the interests of
shareholders), well-developed markets and voting mechanisms exist to
minimize these agency costs. 16 Ultimately, what is most distinctive about
the class action is the absence of any similar mechanism.
Across a variety of contexts, the reduction of agency costs is a stan-
dard goal in organizational design, which typically is pursued by modify-
ing the governance structure of the organization. To use a standard ty-
pology borrowed from the vocabulary of corporate governance, one can
focus on "exit," "voice," or "loyalty" as alternative mechanisms by which to
modify behavior within the organization.' 7 For example, in the corpo-
rate context, the agency costs of holding management accountable to its
shareholders can be reduced by granting shareholders either greater
"voice" (e.g., greater ability to nominate, elect or remove corporate direc-
tors or to communicate with other shareholders) or greater "exit" rights
(e.g., the ability to sell into the market or seek a judicial appraisal of the
fair value of their shares). Market-based remedies-such as the tender
15. For the standard definition of "agency costs," see Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976) (defining agency costs as the sum of the preventive
costs taken by firms to limit misappropriation by their agents, the bonding cost undertaken
by agents themselves, and the irreducible minimum of losses from agent misconduct that it
is not efficient to prevent). For the application of this concept to class actions, see Macey
& Miller, supra note 15, at 12-19.
16. Jensen and Meckling identify two principal means for reducing agency costs:
monitoring by the principal and bonding by the agent. SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note
15, at 308. Neither works well in the class action context. Class members may have too
small an individual stake in the action to engage in costly monitoring, and the primary
bonding mechanism in the market for legal services involves the attorney's investment in
his or her professional reputation. But investment in reputation is an imperfect form of
bonding, particularly where the attorney may "cash in" this reputation in order to receive a
potentially astronomical fee award, where there are time lag and final period problems,
and where the client does not truly select the attorney (which the class does not do, at least
on a majoritarian basis, in class actions). See Macey & Miller, supra note 15, at 16-17 &
n.41.
17. The obvious reference here is to Professor Hirschman's seminal work. See Albert
0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and
States (1970). I use Professor Hirschman's vocabulary because it provides an easily
understood nomenclature but do not intend to adopt any specific conclusions from
Professor Hirschman's work. My use of this terminology grows out of a series of discussions
that I have had over the last year with Professor Samuel Issacharoff, who also uses this
vocabulary in a provocative new article. See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and
Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. - (forthcoming). While we
take somewhat different positions, the idea of extending this familiar terminology from
corporate governance to class actions is a joint one.
[Vol. 100:370
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offer and proxy fight-combine elements of exit and voice in order to
constrain managerial behavior. Correspondingly, within the class action,
one could enhance the exit option by increasing the "opt-out" rights of
class members; alternatively, one could rely more on voice by giving class
members greater authority to hire or fire the class's attorney (or to ap-
prove the settlement). Finally, enhancing the standards for representa-
tional adequacy amounts to a loyalty-based approach, which seeks to im-
pose increased fiduciary or ethical duties on the class representatives.
Necessarily, there are trade-offs between these approaches, and each
should be evaluated in relation to the others.
Concededly, the academic literature on complex litigation has not
analyzed class actions in these agency cost terms, but this may be a symp-
tom of that literature's tunnel vision, which tends to focus only on rules
and cases.1 8 Still, even if reformers have not used this terminology or
been conscious of this perspective, many of their reform proposals can be
characterized as intended to enhance either exit, voice, or loyalty. 19 To
compare and evaluate these proposals, common criteria and a common
perspective are needed. Thus, this Article's initial claim is that a sophisti-
cated approach to the protection of class members must consider and
balance elements under each of these headings. Sometimes, the optimal
answer may be an enhanced right to "exit" the class and pursue an indi-
vidual action; other times, greater voice in the form of an expanded op-
portunity to participate in class decisionmaking or to select class counsel
18. Following Macey & Miller, supra note 15, a few commentators have begun to focus
on the similarities between controlling agency costs in the corporate setting and in the
class action context. See Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of
Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1465, 1466
(1998) (noting analogy to corporate law); see also Issacharoff, supra note 17. This Article,
however, will attempt to move from the analogy of corporate governance to the more
specific legal engineering problems in class action governance.
19. For example, Professor Woolley's proposals to permit class members a greater
right to intervene and participate in class action decisionmaking would be characterized as
a 'voice" reform. See Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate
Representation, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 571, 604 (1997). Correspondingly, Professor Weber's
proposal for a greatly enhanced right to opt out is an example of an "exit" remedy. See
Mark C. Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1155, 1193 (1998). Finally, Professor Koniak
recommends greater use of a guardian ad litem to monitor the performance of plaintiffs'
attorneys in class actions. See Koniak, supra note 15, at 1092. Such a proposed reform
seeks in essence to enhance the "loyalty" of the agent to the principal. All these proposals
are serious and intelligent, but the trade-offs among them are more easily compared and
debated if some common criteria can be established by which to generate points of
reference.
Not all recent reform proposals fit within this nomenclature. In particular, the
proposal of Professors Macey and Miller to auction the legal cause of action to the highest
bidder falls clearly outside. See Macey & Miller, supra note 15, at 105. This is essentially
because their proposal seeks to abolish the principal/agent relationship between attorney
and client and convert the attorney into a principal. This is one way to solve agency cost
problems, but probably a normatively unacceptable way.
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may be the superior remedy; across all contexts, some heightened duty of
loyalty on the part of the agent to its principal is probably also needed.
But the balance among these elements logically should depend on the
costs of reform. Those costs will be a second and major focus of this
Article.
Even in defining the constitutional minimum required by the Due
Process Clause, the trade-offs among these elements can be critical.
20
Their relative importance depends greatly on the context. In traditional
small claimant class actions, where the individual lawsuits would be un-
economical to litigate, the right to exit will mean little, but this same right
becomes critical in mass tort and other large claimant class actions, where
at least some claimants hold high-value claims. Thus, a properly nuanced
theory should recognize that sometimes one element can serve as a func-
tional substitute for another.
To date, the Supreme Court has focused principally on the loyalty
component and ignored the possibility that "exit" and "voice" may some-
times be partial substitutes for ideal representational adequacy. This
omission is perhaps surprising because Ortiz was at bottom a dispute
about the right to exit-whether class members could be locked into a
mandatory class and denied any opt-out rights. In all likelihood, the
Court probably believed it prudent to approach the mandatory class ac-
tion warily and at least initially on a non-constitutional level. Yet, the
more that heightened standards for representational adequacy are recog-
nized as involving costs as well as benefits for class members, the more
that strategies based on "exit" and "voice" need to be balanced and com-
pared. Because some low-level, less visible conflicts will necessarily escape
judicial detection, the loyalty of the agent to the principal can never be
absolute. To say this is not to express cynicism about plaintiffs' attorneys,
but rather to state a truth about all principal/agent relationships: The
agent's self-interest is seldom fully aligned with that of the principal.2 1 As
a result, a single-minded focus on loyalty (i.e., the right to adequate rep-
resentation) may do less to protect class members than a more mul-
tifaceted and balanced theory that enhances rights to exit and voice.
20. For example, this Article will argue that a higher standard of representational
adequacy should be required in the case of a mandatory or non-opt-out class action (where
the class member lacks "exit") than in the case of an opt-out class action under Rule
23(b) (3). A few cases have begun to adopt a similar standard, requiring a higher level of
class cohesion in a non-opt-out class action than in an opt-out class action. See Jefferson v.
Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 896-97 (7th Cir. 1999); see also infra notes 161-164.
Essentially, this development implicitly recognizes that exit can be a partial substitute for
loyalty.
21. A common theme in the theoretical literature on agency costs is that the disparity
in interests between the principal and the agent can be reduced, but never eliminated.
See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in Principals and Agents: The Structure
of Business 37, 37 (John W. Pratt & RichardJ. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. Legal Stud. 189, 190 (1987); Steven Shavell,




The roadmap for this Article follows from these premises. Based on
the premise that the agency costs in representative litigation can be re-
duced,22 this Article will assess in successive sections the possibilities for
enhancing class members' rights to exit, loyalty, and voice-and the
trade-offs among them. The search will not necessarily be for the consti-
tutional minimum, but rather for policy levers that could be used to en-
hance each of those components.
Before undertaking this tour, however, a prior question must be
faced. Everything said up to this point assumes that underlying the class
action is a principal/agent relationship between the attorney and the in-
dividual class members. 23 From this perspective, the class is no more or
less than the aggregation of its individual members. Yet this view is not
universally shared. Some academics have suggested that the class should
be viewed not as an aggregation, but as an entity-much as corporations
or other business organizations are viewed as entities distinct from their
owners. 24 An obvious implication of this approach is that once the attor-
ney becomes counsel to an "entity," the attorney can ignore the prefer-
ences of individual class members-much as counsel to a corporation is
free to disregard the preferences or instructions of individual sharehold-
ers. Indeed, class counsel can more easily resist the attempts of individual
class members to opt out of the class and may be able to define the goals
of the litigation differently than they otherwise would. As a result, this
entity theory provides a justification for the attorney making judgments
in the "best interests" of the class and allocations among class members in
precisely the manner that Amchem seemed to forbid.
Hence, a normative issue must be addressed before appraising the
more instrumental policy options: Who is the client-an entity or an ag-
gregation of individuals? As already indicated, this Article will view at
least the class action for money damages as an aggregation of individuals
22. In the corporate context, the neo-classical economic assumption has been that
agency costs have already been minimized because of the entrepreneur's desire to
maximize share value. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 15, at 310 (arguing that
entrepreneurs reduce agency costs in order to maximize the value they receive for their
shares in a firm when they market those shares to investors). Whatever the accuracy of this
assumption, it is clear that an efficient market does not exist in the market for legal services
and attorneys cannot today sell shares in the action's potential recovery. In this light, one
focus of this Article involves how to introduce more competitive conditions into this
market in order to induce plaintiffs' attorneys to bond themselves to their clients.
23. That the attorney is the agent of the client, who must normally accept the client's
preferences and decisions, is expressly dictated by legal ethics. See Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (1998) ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of the representation, subject to . . . [certain limited
exceptions].").
24. See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 13, 26-32 (1996) (discussing benefits of entity status); David L. Shapiro,
Class Actions: The Class As Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913, 917-18 (1998)




and argue that the alternative entity theory amounts to a transparent
legal fiction. 25 From this premise, this Article will advance its own norma-
tive position: The ethical obligation of the attorney to such a class should
not be to pursue the "best interests" of the class (however determined),
but rather to facilitate client autonomy.
Part I of this Article will begin by examining the organizational real-
ity of class actions and mapping the conflicts that can arise within them.
It will then examine the impact of Amchem and Ortiz on the future of class
action practice. Part II will then seek to evaluate and compare potential
means by which to enhance representational adequacy (or "loyalty"),
voice, and exit in class actions. Part III will then turn to the costs of re-
form-namely, the danger that heightened loyalty standards could lead
to the Balkanization of the class action or to opportunistic holding out by
class members seeking special preferences, in either case with a conse-
quent loss of the class action's efficiency as a mechanism for aggregating
claims. These dangers will lead to this Article's conclusion that enhanc-
ing voice and exit may be more sensible reforms than attempting to insist
upon a rigorous definition of class cohesion. Still, this Article does offer
an easily operationalized standard for when subclassing should be re-
quired, one that distinguishes the traditional small claimant class action
from the "high variance" class actions posed by the facts of Amchem and
Ortiz.
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKDROP
A. Entity or Aggregation: What Is A Class?
Legal fictions gain acceptance more because they are useful than be-
cause they are plausible. In this light, the key attraction of the "entity
model" of the class action is that under it "the entity is the litigant and the
client."26 From this, it follows that "the individual who is a member of the
class ... is and must remain a member of that class, and as a result must
tie his fortunes to those of the group with respect to the litigation, its
progress, and its outcome. 27 The obvious attraction of such a model for
many is that it greatly facilitates the ability of the class action to serve as a
vehicle for the resolution of complex and burdensome mass torts. But
neither legitimizing solutions that enable defendants to economize on
their tort liabilities nor making life easier for trial judges is by itself an
adequate justification for the subordination of the individual to the
group. Still, proponents of the entity model argue that the law has recog-
25. Class actions for equitable and injunctive relief can present different issues and
may require a different theory of representation. See infra notes 161-162 and
accompanying text. This is less because such a class is more "cohesive" or more resembles
a political community than because the remedy must bind all class members. To this
extent, the class members' fates are linked, even if they lack "cohesion."




nized a variety of public and private associations as legal entities that can
sue or be sued in their own right-for example, corporations, partner-
ships, trade unions, and even municipalities. 2 8 Yet, each of these exam-
ples involves factors not present in the case of most class actions and par-
ticularly absent in the case of the mass tort class action.
In overview, the factors that normatively bear on whether an individ-
ual possessing legally recognized claims should be compelled to accept
the determination of an entity (i.e., the class and its counsel) as to
whether to settle or litigate these claims fall under four principal
headings.
1. Consent. - The individual may, of course, accept the class action
as a cheaper or more efficient means of resolving the individual's legal
claim. In such cases where the individual has consented, there is no dis-
pute that the individual should not be able to have it both ways by later
attempting to escape the class if the class action is lost (or results in a
disappointing outcome). Although no one doubts that actual consent
should bind the individual class member, considerable room for debate
exists as to when consent should be inferred. Today, actual notice does
not have to reach class members in order to bind them (if they fail to opt
out from the class); rather, all that is required is that they be sent the
"best notice practicable under the circumstances." 2 9 Inevitably, some
members of a large class will never receive notice and cannot therefore
be assumed to have consented even though they will be bound by the
judgment or settlement.
Implicit consent, of course, can be inferred in some circumstances.
One such example involves instances where the institutional structure
created a specific enforcement mechanism known to the individual and
implicitly accepted by the individual. For example, the trustee represents
the trust vis-a-vis third parties. Implicit consent may be found here in the
donor's or grantor's knowing adoption of the trust format.
3 0
In these cases, it is fair to say that consent may be implied because
the individual knew the "rules of the game" at the time that he or she
voluntarily associated with the group. For example, suppose that a share-
28. See id. at 921.
29. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (requiring "the best notice practicable under the
circumstances"). Under prevailing precedents, actual notice need not be provided to class
members, so long as the "best practicable" notice was given to absent class members. See
Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating the "best notice practicable"
standard); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 167-68 (2d Cir. 1987)
(same).
30. Alternatively, consent may be expressed by the beneficiaries themselves by their
acceptance of the terms of the contract that governs their rights. For example, bond
indentures often explicitly provide that under most circumstances only the trustee or a
specified percentage of bondholders (usually 25%) may bring suit against the issuer. See,
e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 906 F.2d 884, 888 (2d Cir. 1990).
Bondholders who buy with actual or constructive notice of the indenture's terms will and
should be bound by these contractual terms.
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holder in a corporation learns that the corporation's president has em-
bezzled $10,000,000 from the firm and that the shareholder's loss (based
on a five percent ownership) is therefore $500,000. Under the traditional
rules of corporate law, the shareholder may not sue in his individual ca-
pacity (or as the representative of a class);31 rather, only the corporation
can bring suit-either directly or by means of a derivative action.
Although technically the derivative action is not a class action, it is an-
other form of representative litigation, and under its rules the individual
is subordinated to the entity. However, this result occurs as a matter of
substantive corporate law; the individual never actually held the legal
rights or claims against the corporate officials that others are seeking to
assert or settle on the individual's behalf. Even more importantly, the
individual can be said to have voluntarily assented to this arrangement at
the time that he or she acquired shares in the firm.
2. Majoritarian Control. - An individual's legal rights may also be
entrusted to an entity by contract or by statutory law under a legal regime
that permits the majority to bind the minority. The typical bondholder
indenture is an example of such a contractual mechanism, and federal
labor law provides a similar statutory example. Under the National Labor
Relations Act, a majority of the employees in a designated bargaining unit
may select a bargaining representative (i.e., a union), who will represent
all employees in the unit.32 In such cases, the individual is indeed sub-
merged within the entity, but based on a legislatively imposed norm of
majority rule.
No such majoritarian mechanism operates in the class action.
Although steering committees are often used, they are composed of law-
yers, not the clients. Conceivably, client elections of a class representative
(or a steering committee) might be possible in some limited types of class
actions, where the individual stakes are large enough to overcome the
clients' rational apathy. But in other contexts, such as small-claimant
class actions where the individual damages are small, few claimants would
participate. Even in cases where the individual damages may be large
(such as the mass tort class action), the client's voice may be muted by the
fact that most victims do not yet know that they have been injured. Given
the long latency period in many mass tort class actions, the class members
will ordinarily not be identifiable, and hence any democratic election will
normally be infeasible.
31. Under standard corporate law principles, "a wrongful act that depletes corporate
assets and thereby injures shareholders only indirectly" cannot be challenged by the
shareholder in a direct action, but only in a derivative action and only then in the unusual
circumstances when demand on the board can be excused. American Law Institute,
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 7.01 cmt. c (1994).
(The author served as Reporter to The American Law Institute for this topic of the
derivative action).
32. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (5), 159 (1994).
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3. Prior Association or Community of Interests. - Another possible justi-
fication for permitting an entity to represent and determine the best in-
terests of the class members is that the class logically shares a community
of interests that pre-exists or is otherwise extrinsic to the litigation. For
example, residents of a neighborhood, members of a private association,
adherents of a religious congregation, or advocates of a political cause
may well share strong common interests-at least if the litigation truly
relates to those interests and pits the group or association against some
outside group. Indeed, this is where the class action historically began.
For example, in a famous case, the mayor of one English city sued citizens
of other nearby towns on behalf of the residents of his city in a dispute
over fishing rights in a local river.33 Recognizing the role of an elected
representative to serve as the centralized litigation authority for that offi-
cial's constituency seems a fairly simple judicial step, but the develop-
ment continued. Later cases permitted fraternal orders and other unin-
corporated associations to sue on behalf of their members. 34 On such a
basis, members of a village, a parish, or a guild could be represented and
bound by their organization or an appropriate officer thereof.
Two facts stand out about these cases. First, the entity pre-existed
the litigation. Second, in the medieval and pre-industrial eras, an individ-
ual's identity was to a greater extent defined by the individual's residence
or membership in a village, parish, or guild.3 5 Today, a member of a
group (for example, a labor union) does not necessarily share that
group's views about the environment, politics, abortion, or any other so-
cial issue. Nor would a union member necessarily see her interests
aligned with those of her union with regard to her claims against an em-
ployer for exposure to a dangerous product or substance in the work-
place. Even if the union were eager to represent its members and to
organize litigation on their behalf, this interest might still be traded off
against other interests (for example, higher wages) that other, non-in-
jured workers shared. In any event, no logical reason is apparent why
individual union members would necessarily want to settle their high-
value claims according to a formula that the union thought appropriate.
Given the high stakes involved, some might prefer instead to opt out and
accept the risk of suing individually. In short, the union is not a natural
"vicarious representative" for its members.
Although the extent to which these historical examples provide rele-
vant models for today can reasonably be debated, it seems doubtful that
33. See Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 25 Eng. Rep. 946 (Ch. 1737).
34. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loaring, 31 Eng. Rep. 1302 (Ch. 1802). For a U.S. decision
similarly permitting a fraternal order to represent its members, see Supreme Tribe of Ben-
Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921).
35. This point has, of course, been made by many others. See Stephen C. Yeazell,
From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action 52-68 (1987); Robert G.
Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative
Representation, 70 B.U. L. Rev. 213, 220 (1990).
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individuals who are simply seeking money damages in a class action be-
cause of a common injury (which may have been sustained at widely sepa-
rated times and places) share any meaningful prior associations or com-
munity. To be sure, they may be made worse off if individual actions
deplete the defendant's limited assets. This, though, is not an argument
that the class is an entity, but rather that individuals would rationally elect
to be restrained for their mutual benefit.
4. Homogenous Preferences. - Probably the weakest normative basis
for deeming individuals to belong to a collective entity that can deter-
mine their rights is that they share the same preferences and hence can
be efficiently collectivized. Questionable as this basis may be as a norma-
tive matter, it probably works adequately for some class actions. For ex-
ample, in securities class actions, it can be safely assumed that the class
shares a common preference for more money rather than less. More im-
portantly, because the damages will be calculated on a per-share basis, an
automatic allocation formula exists, thereby usually reducing intra-class
tensions. 36 Also, because shareholders hold diversified portfolios of se-
curities, it is likely that most class members have suffered damages that
are small in proportion to their overall portfolios. The import of this fact
is that class members should tend to be risk-neutral and hence should
share a common attitude toward to the evaluation of any settlement offer
(at least if they share a common estimate of the litigation risks). As dis-
cussed below, this assumption of risk-neutrality does not work in the mass
tort class action, where class members have typically suffered injuries
ranging from the trivial to the fatal. Here, widely varying attitudes toward
risk are predictable.
5. Theories of Representation and the Class Action. - Many of the fore-
going objections boil down to this basic problem: By what right is the
class representative entitled to make highly discretionary decisions on be-
half of the class? Philosophers and political scientists have recognized
that a common principle of legitimacy within political bodies is that the
representatives should mirror their constituents. 37 But legislative bodies
are different from the class action in a variety of ways, the most notable of
which is that the representative is held accountable through regular elec-
tions. Also, the representative is the true decisionmaker. In contrast, in
the class action, the class representative is usually a token figure, with the
class counsel being the real party in interest. Because the class counsel,
not the class representative, is the party who invests in the action and
expects the real economic payoff from its success, it may matter little
36. Allocation issues can still arise even in this context, as individual class members
may have purchased their securities either before or after a particular alleged misstatement
or omission. If the legal strength of their claims differ materially, there may again be a
need for subclassing. See infra notes 64-64 and accompanying text.
37. See Pitkin, supra note 14, at 61-62, 84-89. This theme regularly surfaces in the
debate over proportional representation and litigation over "at large" voting districts.
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whether the class representative mirrors the characteristics of the class
members.
Where does this simple truth lead? Theorists have distinguished be-
tween "formal representation" and "descriptive representation. '38 The
former is based on contractual agreements that delegate authority to the
class representative to act for the class, while the latter is based on a corre-
spondence between the relevant characteristics of the agent and the prin-
cipal. While "descriptive representation" may not be meaningless in the
litigation context, it is still an inadequate and incomplete theory upon
which to vest broad discretionary authority in the agent. Thus, some al-
ternative mechanism of representation seems necessary. In overview, two
alternatives seem possible: (1) greater reliance could be placed on for-
mal contracting, or (2) in some contexts, direct democracy could be a
partial substitute for representation and might operate through the use
of referenda.
To sum up, the "entity theory" posits the existence of factors that
unite the class and that make it more than an aggregation of individuals
holding similar claims against common defendants. To date, however, its
proponents have failed to identify these factors in the case of the class
action for money damages. In such a class action, there is no community
of similarly situated persons who can rely on "descriptive representation,"
but only a motley assortment of individuals who at most may find it effi-
cient to economize on transaction costs by sharing an attorney or who
may enjoy increased leverage by aggregating their claims. Internal unity
within the class sufficient to justify reliance on "descriptive representa-
tion" probably arises only in the rarest of cases, which typically involve
claims for structural relief, not monetary damages. 39 To be sure, effi-
ciency arguments do exist for collectivizing class members (e.g., their
claims may not be economically viable on an individual basis or the de-
fendant's assets might be exhausted before the plaintiff's individual case
could be heard). But these are efficiency arguments for the class action,
not for presuming the class to be a natural entity.
B. The Pervasiveness of Conflicts
Even if extrinsic factors that unite the class do exist, other factors will
still typically divide class members into contending subgroups. In over-
38. Id. at 112-43. Pitkin also uses a third category, which she calls "symbolic
representation," which has even less relevance to this context.
39. Even in the classic illustration of a school desegregation case, there may be
significant divergences within the class in terms of the remedy desired. For a strong
statement of this view, see Derrick A. Bell,Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470, 505-12 (1976). For
example, some minority group parents may prefer an integrationist remedy, while others
might prefer a remedy based on increased funding. The fact that the class representative is
a minority group parent does little to assure that this conflict is resolved in a legitimate
way, even if this fact does satisfy the standards of "descriptive representation."
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view, structural conflicts in the mass tort class action can be grouped
under four basic headings: (1) internal conflicts that exist within the
class-typically, because subcategories of class members are competing
over the allocation of the settlement; (2) external conflicts that arise be-
cause class members (or their attorneys) have some extraneous reason
for favoring a settlement that does not truly benefit the interests of all
class members; (3) risk conflicts that arise because class members or class
counsel have very different attitudes about the level of risk they are will-
ing to bear; and (4) conflicts over control of the litigation.
1. Internal Conflicts. - Whenever the injuries suffered by class mem-
bers are relatively heterogenous, internal conflicts necessarily arise. For-
tunately, this circumstance does not prevail in the case of most commer-
cial class actions because typically in these cases, some objective measure
permits the damages to be automatically allocated without any discretion-
ary decision by class counsel. Thus, whether the individual shareholder
in the typical securities class action has large or small losses, the share-
holder's losses can be easily determined by reference to the stock market
decline in the share price of the security. Problems only surface when
the class period is extended, so that some investor plaintiffs have claims
of lesser legal strength than those plaintiffs who relied on the principal
alleged misstatements or omissions. Similarly, in an antitrust class action,
all class members will typically have suffered a known increase in a com-
modity price because of collusion, and they will differ primarily in terms
of the amount of their purchases (and hence their injuries). Thus, even
if the losses vary among individual class members, these losses can be
objectively calculated in a manner that does not create conflicts within
the class.
In contrast, in mass tort class actions, exposure to a particular sub-
stance, chemical, or drug may produce widely varying injuries, ranging
from the trivial to the fatal. To illustrate, assume that exposure to a toxic
product or substance creates two significantly different types of injuries:
(1) a moderately disabling condition (such as asbestosis) which impairs
the individual's ability to function or hold employment (but is generally
not fatal), and (2) a usually fatal disease (such as mesothelioma). In such
cases, there predictably will be disputes both as to the relative value of
these claims and as to their priority for payment. Some argue that the
"worst should go first"4 0-with the result that the fatally or more seriously
injured should recover more or less in full before the less disabled re-
cover anything. Conversely, the moderately disabled can argue that they
also have families and dependents to support, and to the extent that they
will survive longer in a disabled and unemployable condition, they need
even greater compensation. Similarly, it can be reasonably debated what
the ratio between the value of their injuries should be: 2:1, 3:1, or 10:1.
40. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in
Asbestos Litigation, 75 Judicature 318 (1992) (advocating as a rationing device that lesser
injuries be deferred without cash recovery until (and if) they became more severe).
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As the Supreme Court essentially recognized in Amchem, no single class
representative can act for both these subgroups because they are inher-
ently warring over the allocation of the settlement.
41
Differences in the severity of injuries represents only one form of
internal conflict. Even starker is the tension between present claimants
and future claimants. The former will logically want high individual dam-
ages, coupled with an immediate payout and hopefully punitive damages
that can be quickly distributed to them. 42 The latter will equally logically
want the settlement fund to retain funds to protect its solvency until their
claims mature. Hence, they will want to restrict large individual payouts
until it can be reliably established that future claimants will also be paid.
Logically, future claimants would also resist punitive damage awards in
order to retain funds for the most disabled of them in the future. Finally,
present claimants may be content with a lump-sum settlement (which de-
fendants will predictably prefer), while future claimants will presumably
prefer an open-ended settlement that does not cap the defendant's total
liability. Because the number of future claimants will usually be very spec-
ulative, a lump-sum settlement shifts the residual risk of the mass tort
from the defendants to the future claimants (but does not significantly
prejudice present claimants).
While the foregoing conflicts were recognized in Amchem, Ortiz ad-
ded a new dimension to the problem by finding that differences in the
legal or economic strength of class members' claims may also necessitate
subclassing. 43 Once this is recognized, the potential fault lines that run
through many class actions multiply quickly. Some class members may
reside in jurisdiction X (where the local substantive law is very favorable
to them), while others may reside in jurisdiction Y (where the substantive
law is essentially adverse). Given this disparity, should class counsel seek
to obtain higher recoveries for the residents ofjurisdiction X? Or, should
counsel seek to impose a federal or other uniform rule of liability for this
multistate class action with the result that the damage awards will be aver-
aged? Or, does such an attempt amount to a forbidden allocation which
41. According to the Amchem decision, "the interests of those within the single class
are not aligned" because "named parties with diverse medical conditions sought to act on
behalf of a single giant class rather than on behalf of discrete subclasses." Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997). This language of interest alignment is important
because it is the standard "law and economics" vocabulary for dealing with principal/agent
problems.
42. Again, Amchem states this explicitly: "Most saliently, for the currently injured, the
critical goal is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs against the interest of
exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future." Id.
43. In Ortiz, the majority decision stressed the difference in position between those
class members who had been exposed to Fibreboard's products before 1959 and those
exposed only afterwards. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2320 (1999).
Because Fibreboard's principal insurance policy with Continental expired in 1959, the
Court stated that: "Pre-1959 claimants accordingly had more valuable claims than post-
1959 claimants", which in turn produced "disparate interests within the certified class." Id.
For a fuller discussion of this point, see infra note 66.
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an individual lawyer cannot make under Amchem and so requires subclas-
sing? Of course, if the entity model is accepted, such damage averaging is
more easily defended; but, if the aggregation model is chosen, the rights
of individual class members must be respected.
2. External Conflicts. - If Amchem illustrated the problem of internal
conflicts within the class, Ortiz exemplified and emphasized external con-
flicts. In Ortiz, plaintiffs' counsel were offered a favorable settlement for
their large inventories of individual clients, but on the condition that
these same attorneys agree to serve as class counsel in an action seeking
to resolve the rights of future claimants. 44 After Ortiz, such "side settle-
ments" now seem to represent a per se "impermissible conflict of inter-
est."4 5 But if so, any other pending litigation brought by class counsel
against the same defendant creates a potential conflict to the extent that
the terms of one settlement might be traded off against the other. Typi-
cally, experienced class counsel in a mass tort class action may have a
large inventory of individual actions pending against the same defend-
ants. Thus, although disqualifying class counsel on this basis after Ortiz
may be justified, the impact of such disqualifications on the plaintiffs' bar
with experience in these actions may be fairly sweeping.
Although class action conflicts usually involve the interests of class
counsel, the class representative can also have its own conflicts with the
other class members. A fascinating, but little-noticed example arose in
Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., which involved an accompanying defendants'
class action. 46 Defendant class actions are as rare as unicorns, generally
because defendants do not wish to risk having their rights resolved by a
representative. Nonetheless, Fibreboard's problem was that not only had
innumerable plaintiffs sued it for asbestos-related claims, but most fellow
asbestos defendants had the right to seek either contribution or indemni-
fication from it. For example, distributors of Fibreboard's asbestos prod-
ucts had regularly sued Fibreboard for payments they had made to asbes-
tos victims on account of Fibreboard products. Similarly, other asbestos
manufacturers possessed claims against Fibreboard for contribution to
the extent that these manufacturers had paid claims levied against them
44. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2318.
45. Id. (citing Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement
Class Actions": An Introduction, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 811, 832 (1995) for the proposition
that "side settlements suggest that class counsel has been laboring under an impermissible
conflict of interest . . ").
46. See Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 6:93cv526, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11531
(E.D. Tex. July 27, 1995). The existence of this separate settlement with Fibreboard's co-
defendants is noted in Ortiz. See 119 S. Ct. at 2304 n.4 & 2306 n.8. I must disclose that I
was retained as an expert witness by members of this defendant class (i.e., large defendants
who did not want their claims for contribution or indemnification to be released by a
conflicted representative) who sought to attack the settlement collaterally on grounds of
the inadequacy of the class representative. See Fibreboard Corp. v. Plant Insulation Co.,
No. 757932-5 (Alameda Super. Ct. filed Oct. 5, 1995). That action has, of course, been
mooted by the outcome in Ortiz.
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under a "market share" theory of liability. Finally, a miscellaneous assort-
ment of landlords, building owners, architects, engineers, and other per-
sons that had owned, designed, constructed, sold, leased, or occupied
premises containing Fibreboard's products also possessed potential
causes of action against Fibreboard.
To resolve all these claims, Fibreboard approached another large as-
bestos manufacturer and distributor, Owens-Illinois, Inc., to represent all
defendants holding asbestos claims against Fibreboard. Under the pro-
posed settlement, all members in the class would essentially waive their
rights against Fibreboard in a mandatory, non-opt-out class action in re-
turn for the creation of a settlement fund to be established by
Fibreboard's insurers. Owens-Illinois was, however, uniquely conflicted.
First, because it was a fellow asbestos manufacturer, both it and
Fibreboard necessarily held reciprocal claims for contribution against
each other. In contrast, the other defendants in the class-Fibreboard's
distributors and other third party defendants-held claims against
Fibreboard, but were not in any realistic sense liable to Fibreboard. Sec-
ond, and even more ominous, subsequent events revealed that Owens-
Illinois, Inc. was itself considering a similar global limited-fund class ac-
tion in order to terminate its own asbestos liabilities. In short, if the
Fibreboard global settlement could be upheld, it would constitute a
blueprint for Owens-Illinois, which might then follow suit.
In overview, it is hard to think of a less adequate representative than
Owens-Illinois. In effect, a Fibreboard creditor that was also Fibreboard's
debtor was representing a class of other creditors against Fibreboard, and
it was apparently hoping to establish a legal precedent that could reduce
its own substantial asbestos liabilities. The entire proceeding seemed a
dress rehearsal for Owens-Illinois's own potential class action. Nonethe-
less, although some class members objected to Owens-Illinois's acting in
this conflicted role as their representative, the federal district court ap-
proved the settlement. The lesson here is that once a potential settle-
ment of complex litigation is in view, federal trial courts tend to tolerate
almost any conflict in order to achieve a settlement that brings litigation
peace-but at a cost paid by the class members.
3. Risk Conflicts. - The foregoing conflicts have involved either spe-
cial extrinsic relationships between a fiduciary for the class and the de-
fendants or a high level of heterogeneity within the class. But even in the
absence of such facts, a more basic conflict remains. Imagine two simi-
larly situated victims of the same mass tort injury. Both have equivalent
injuries, which will in time prove fatal. One, however, has multiple de-
pendents who require financial support, while the other does not. The
latter plaintiff wants to win the largest possible recovery to vindicate his
rights and punish the defendant; the former cannot afford this luxury of
moral vindication and desperately needs a settlement to support her chil-
dren. Hence, the former wants a quick settlement, while the latter insists
on gambling on a trial. In overview, the latter plaintiff can be called a risk
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preferrer, while the former is risk averse. Neither has the same attitude
toward the litigation, nor approaches the settlement/trial decision from
the same perspective. Nevertheless, under all established precedents,
either could serve as the class representative for a class action containing
the other as a class member.
47
Arguably, little harm may result from this variety of conflict-so long
as either plaintiff can opt out, once it is clear what the other plaintiffs
preferences are. But the practical ability to opt out and pursue one's own
preferences requires that special circumstances exist, and often these
conditions are lacking. For example, the class may be a mandatory, non-
opt-out class or the period for opting out may have expired before the
proposed settlement is first disclosed. Or, the individual claim, even
though substantial, may be uneconomical once divorced from the aggre-
gate body of claims.
Conflicts among class members over issues of risk tolerance are over-
shadowed in turn by an even more fundamental conflict over risk: An
almost inevitable conflict arises between class members and class counsel.
In the typical small-claimant class action that supplies the basic rationale
for the modern class action, no individual class member will have an ex-
pected recovery sufficient tojustify individual litigation. Given their small
stakes, class members should logically be risk neutral in their approach to
litigation decisions (and in particular to whether to accept a proposed
settlement offer). Even where the recovery may be larger, such as in se-
curities class actions, most investors will be diversified and so should
again be relatively risk neutral.
But this same generalization does not hold for plaintiffs' attorneys.
Effectively, class action plaintiffs' attorneys are joint venturers with their
clients who strike a bargain with them under which they will advance the
litigation's actual expenses and receive a median contingent fee that is
typically between 27% and 30% of the class's recovery, plus their ex-
penses from the class's recovery fund. 48 Class counsel are, however, far
less diversified than securities investors, and by the point that settlement
negotiations begin in earnest in the typical class action, they may have
already invested several million dollars of their own funds in carrying the
litigation. Even beyond these reimbursable litigation expenses, plaintiffs'
counsel will also have invested their own time plus the time of their asso-
ciates, paralegals, and staff. Given this financial outlay and the significant
opportunity cost that the litigation represents to them, plaintiffs' attor-
47. Particularly to the extent that class certification precedes settlement, the court will
never know the attitudes of the class representatives toward a proposed settlement that
does not then exist.
48. For the finding that median fee awards in class actions are within this range, see
Thomas Willging et al., Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts:
Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 69 (1996). While median fee
awards ranged only between 27% and 30% of the recovery fee, average awards ranged
more broadly between 20% to 40% of the recovery. See id.
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neys are unlikely to be as risk neutral in their approach to the litigation as
the average class member can be. To illustrate, consider the difference
between: (1) a class member facing a decision whether to accept a settle-
ment that will pay him a certain $1,000 or a risky $1,500 if the action is
litigated further, and (2) a plaintiffs' attorney facing the choice between a
defendant-proposed settlement that will mean a likely fee award for the
attorney of $5,000,000 and further litigation that might yield a fee award
of $7,500,000. Although the same proportions are involved, the marginal
utility of money makes a major difference here, and one strongly suspects
that it will be far easier for the class member to walk away from this settle-
ment offer than for the plaintiffs' attorney.
Next, add to this picture the additional likely facts that the attorney
has advanced litigation expenses of $500,000 to the class and that in real-
ity, the fee award will typically tend to be a declining percentage of the
recovery to the class. Now, two additional reasons for attorney risk aver-
sion emerge. First, because the plaintiffs' attorney is inherently a creditor
of the class action, but will not receive any truly risk-related return on the
$500,000 expenses that the attorney has advanced to the class, the attor-
ney should logically be disinclined to accept risks that the class may con-
sider acceptable. Creditors inherently tend to be more risk averse to the
extent that their return is limited and they do not receive a risk-adjusted
premium. Second, because the fee award does not increase proportion-
ately with the recovery (at least not after some point),4° the attorney's
self-interest is poorly aligned with that of the class. It is simply unrealistic
to expect the attorney to accept additional risk without the prospect of
commensurate return.
All this adds up to a pessimistic assessment: Across a broad range of
cases, plaintiffs' attorneys will be more risk averse than class members in
considering settlement offers and will wish to accept many offers that the
class will rationally wish to reject. To be sure, class members may also be
irrationally optimistic about the litigation odds in many cases, either be-
cause they lack "real world" experience with litigation or because they
have a strong emotional desire for vindication that exists apart from their
financial incentives. Nonetheless, the bottom line is that this conflict
over risk is basic and recurring.
In turn, this suggests that the leading cause of "cheap settlements"
may not be collusion between class counsel and defendants (as some have
argued5 °), but rather a basic differential in the level of risk aversion.
What can be done about this? A partial answer no doubt lies in the use of
more sophisticated fee formulas that compensate class counsel for ac-
49. For a summary of the evidence that fee awards decline as a percentage of the
recovery as the recovery increases, see In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187
F.R.D. 465, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
50. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 1, at 1051-89.
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cepting risk,5 1 but this topic is beyond the scope of this Article. The opti-
mal answer cannot lie in disqualifying class counsel for risk aversion, be-
cause most class counsel will, to greater or lesser degrees, be subject to
this problem.
4. Conflicts over Control. - A final factor that can increase the readi-
ness of the plaintiffs' attorneys to accept an inadequate settlement in-
volves the risk of a competing class action being brought by a rival team
of plaintiffs' attorneys. Such competitions between rival proposed nation-
wide class actions have become increasingly common. 52 If we assume that
both rival teams of plaintiffs' attorneys are roughly equally competent,
class members might be rationally indifferent to which team won. But
the rival legal teams cannot be indifferent, because only the winning
team will be entitled to a court-awarded attorney's fee. Hence, both
teams have an incentive to strike an early deal with the defendants, and
the defendants can in turn exploit this leverage and force an auction be-
tween these rival teams to see which will make (or accept) the lowest
settlement offer.5 3 Even when no rival class action is filed, plaintiffs' at-
torneys understand that one might be filed, and hence they may be anx-
ious to negotiate an early settlement before a rival bidder appears. Fi-
nally, class counsel is aware that if they press defendants "too hard,"
defendants may actually solicit a rival team of plaintiffs' attorneys to file
an action elsewhere and then may enter an immediate settlement with
these new entrants. So long as this rival action is filed in a different state
court, the court hearing the original class action-whether a state court
or a federal court-will be essentially powerless to stop this potential re-
verse auction.
54
51. I have argued elsewhere that the plaintiffs' attorney's fee award should increase
(rather than decrease, as it does today) as a percentage of the recovery as the recovery
increases above the standard recovery in order to induce the attorney to accept greater risk
and pursue an above average recovery. However, to avoid over-compensation, the fee
award should begin at a lower percentage than it does today. See Coffee, Understanding
the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 15, at 725-26.
52. A major impetus has been the Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1996), which held that state courts have
jurisdiction to enter binding orders and approve settlements in class actions even with
regard to claims that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try. Thus, a state court
settlement releasing federal antitrust or securities law claims will carry "full faith and
credit," even though federal law gives exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts
over these claims. As a result, competitions between rival class actions covering federal
securities or federal antitrust claims are now possible between federal and state court
actions.
53. I have elsewhere described this process in more detail and called it the "reverse
auction" phenomenon. Coffee, supra note 1, at 1370-72.
54. Professor Geoffrey Miller has examined the judicial tools that are available to a
federal court in this context, especially the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994). See
Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 514, 538-39 (1996).
Subsequent decisions convince me, however, that this Act, as currently interpreted,
provides little significant protection for class members. See In re General Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 137-38 (3d Cir. 1998) (refusing
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The bottom line then is that rational class members and rational
class counsel are likely to evaluate a proposed settlement very differently.
Although rational class members should only settle based on the litiga-
tion odds and will compare the proposed settlement with their dis-
counted estimate of the probable outcome at trial, rational plaintiffs' at-
torneys will need to consider also the prospect that a competitor may
emerge, thereby inclining them to accept a cheaper settlement. This may
not be the same phenomenon as actual collusion, but the results can look
very similar. Hence, the inescapable point here is that, under current
law, one cannot realistically expect the plaintiffs' attorney to be as loyal to
the class members' interests as the classic fiduciary can be to its benefici-
ary. The guardian or trustee neither has the same personal stake in the
matter nor faces the same risks. Hence, other approaches-in particular,
enhancing "exit" and "voice"-must be considered in addition to
"loyalty."
C. The Impact of Amchem and Ortiz
Against this backdrop of pervasive conflicts, what new constraints do
Amchem and Ortiz impose? Both cases involved remarkably similar fact
patterns: sprawling mass tort class actions involving every conceivable po-
sition on a spectrum of injury running from mere exposure to fatal dis-
eases caused only by asbestos. 55 Amchem focused principally on the differ-
ences among class members and the fact that the terms of the settlement
unevenly allocated the recovery among these various categories of plain-
tiffs, rewarding some and denying any compensation to others. In the
Amchem Court's view, this allocation was impermissible because the class
representatives had not acted on behalf of discrete subclasses, but rather
had sought to represent the class as a whole.5 6 Given the diversity of
interests and injuries affected by the settlement, Amchem understandably
insisted that there be some "structural assurance of fair and adequate rep-
resentation for the diverse groups and individuals affected." 57 This assur-
ance could be most easily provided, it said, by a negotiating structure
under which each representative served "for a separate constituency,"
and not "as representative for the whole."58 In short, the strong implica-
tion of Amchem was that allocations have to be bargained out among sub-
to enjoin Louisiana state court nationwide class action that was a rival to an earlier filed
federal nationwide class action).
55. It is generally recognized that mesothelioma, an invariably fatal cancer of the lung
lining tissue, is principally caused by asbestos exposure. See, e.g., Becht v. Owens Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 196 F.3d 650, 652 (6th Cir. 1999); Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352,
356 (3d Cir. 1999); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Sain, 162 F.3d 813, 815 (4th Cir. 1998).
56. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997).
57. Id.
58. Id. The Court did, however, indicate that an appropriate "assurance" might also
be found in "the terms of the settlement," as opposed to "the structure of the
negotiations." Id. It is not entirely clear what this distinction involves, but it does open the
door to the possibility that the availability of exit-such as in the form of a continuing and
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classes, each presumably with its own counsel, and not resolved by class
counsel acting as a neutral philosopher king. Although this message has
revolutionary implications for existing class action practices (where such
allocations by a single counsel have been a common event), Amchem still
left vague just how serious the differences among class members had to
be before such subclassing was required.
In Ortiz, the settling parties believed that they had discovered a sim-
ple expedient by which to sidestep and outflank the Amchem allocation
problem. By avoiding any specific allocation or damage award schedule
and instead consigning each class member to a post-approval arbitration
procedure, the settling parties could argue that no allocation had been
made and hence there was no need for subclassing. Although a divided
Fifth Circuit panel accepted this distinction,59 the Supreme Court dis-
missed it as superficial, finding that the failure to differentiate "the claims
of the immediately injured" from "the more speculative claims of those
projected to have future injuries" was itself a preference for one group
over another.60 In essence, the Court found that to treat "unlike" cases
alike was as much an "allocation decision" forbidden by Amchem as any
actual disparity in the amounts awarded. 61 Indeed, Ortiz is far clearer
than Amchem that subclassing must be accompanied by separate represen-
tation, with a "division into homogeneous subclasses ... with separate
representation to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel."62 Whereas
Amchem had largely focused only on the class representatives, Ortiz recog-
nized that representatives in fact rely on class counsel and hence different
counsel for each subclass would be necessary.
63
Even more importantly, Ortiz tightened the concept of cohesion
within the class, applying it not simply to gross differences in the nature
of the plaintiffs' injuries but also to differences in the legal and negotiat-
ing positions of the class members. After Amchem, it was at least arguable
that only the distinction between present and future claimants truly re-
quired subclassing. But Ortiz laid this modest reading of Amchem to rest.
Because the Ortiz class "included those exposed to Fibreboard's asbestos
products both before and after 1959,"64 the date on which Fibreboard's
principal insurance policy expired, the Court found that the pre-1959
claimants held "more valuable claims than post-1959 claimants" and so
belonged in a separate subclass. 65 Arguably, if this difference required
unlimited right to opt out-could have relevance and save an allocation that would
otherwise flunk Amchem's bargaining requirements.
59. See In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d 668, 669-70 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd, Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
60. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2320.
61. Id. ("The very decision to treat them all the same is itself an allocation
decision ... .
62. Id. at 2319.
63. See id. at 2319 n.31.




subclassing (and separate counsel), then a host of other differences
might also. Viewed simply in terms of intra-class differences, the expira-
tion of an insurance policy means only that the claims of some class mem-
bers are more valuable than those of others, and other common legal
variables-such as the possible expiration of a statute of limitations or
legal differences among jurisdictions in the elements of a particular cause
of action-similarly imply that some class members have more valuable
claims than others. Yet, alternatively, the failure to create subclasses for
the pre- and post-1959 claimants can be viewed as, itself, strong evidence
of collusion on the special facts of Ortiz.
66
66. The key premise to Justice Breyer's dissent in Ortiz and the core justification
advanced by the proponents of the Ortiz settlement was the alleged urgent need of all the
participants to reach and implement a global deal before the California appellate court
decided the coverage action brought by Fibreboard against its two liability insurers.
According to Justice Breyer, "[w]ithin weeks after the parties' settlement agreement, the
insurance policies might well have disappeared, leaving most potential plaintiffs with little
more than empty claims. The ship was about to sink, the trust fund to evaporate; time was
important." Id. at 2329 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But this analysis badly misunderstands the
facts. Time was not necessarily important to Fibreboard. Whatever happened in the
coverage case, it was still destined to become bankrupt in a relatively short period of time.
This was because the two insurance policies covering it only applied to asbestos exposure
claims arising before 1959. The policy issued by Pacific Indemnity Company covered
claimants whose claims arose in 1956 and 1957. Fibreboard simply had no liability
insurance with respect to workers who were first exposed to asbestos after 1959. Alone,
these claims were sufficient to bankrupt Fibreboard. The district court that approved the
Ortiz settlement estimated Fibreboard's value (free of asbestos liabilities) at $235 million.
See Abeam v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 529 (E.D. Tex. 1995). Although this
estimate may have been low, the total number of pending asbestos claims against
Fibreboard was estimated in the claims notice mailed to class members at 200,000 (and
additional future claims were certain to arise). See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1400 & n.217.
If one were to value the typical claim at $20,000, this would imply an aggregate liability of
at least $4 billion (exclusive of future claims). In short, the post-1959 uninsured claims
dwarfed Fibreboard's assets, and the district court expressly found that Fibreboard could
not have avoided bankruptcy even if it had won the insurance coverage litigation. See
Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 529.
Thus, to avoid bankruptcy, Fibreboard's goal had to be to use the insurance coverage
litigation to force a global settlement that also extinguished post-1959 claims. In part, this
goal required the use of the available insurance to settle the post-1959 claims. Presumably,
if the pre-1959 claimants were represented by loyal representatives (whom they had
personally retained), these counsel would have objected to any such dissipation of the
insurance assets that were uniquely intended to benefit pre-1959 claimants. But class
counsel knew that Fibreboard would only agree to a class action settlement (and thereby
make possible a class action fee award) if the settlement averted bankruptcy by resolving
the post-1959 claims. Hence, both to achieve this settlement and to obtain the inventory
settlements applicable to their individual clients (whose claims were linked to the class
action's settlement), class counsel had to acquiesce in this seeming misappropriation of
the insurance policies that by contract protected only pre-1959 claimants.
In this light, the seeming indifference of class counsel to the critical distinction
between pre-1959 and post-1959 claims is not simply an example of class counsel making
an arguably impermissible allocation between two subgroups within the class, but rather
evidences collusion by a conflicted class counsel. Under this proposed narrower
interpretation, Ortiz should be read not as mandating subclassing whenever there is a
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The implications of this distinction only come into clear focus when
we consider how many different subclasses might be required under the
broader reading of Ortiz even in the case of a garden variety, small claim-
ant class action. Consider, for example, a hypothetical tort class action
involving only three characteristic types of injury (small, medium, and
large), but also involving the common law of multiple states (whose laws
subdivide in turn into three categories: strict liability, negligence, and
intentional misconduct), and extending over time periods that raise is-
sues under eachjurisdiction's statute of limitations. On this basis of three
types of injury, three applicable legal rules, and two statute of limitations
categories, there would logically need to be eighteen distinct subclasses,
each apparently with its own counsel under Ortiz. That is, each additional
factor must be multiplied by, and not simply added to, the other factors.
Nor is this example far-fetched. 67 Many other legal or economic issues
can be imagined that would push this number far higher (e.g., the rela-
tive solvency of different defendants, the existence of insurance policies
applicable to the claims of some but not all class members, special statu-
tory causes of action or affirmative defenses applicable to some, but not
all, class members, etc.).
At this point, Ortiz and Amchem could call into question the viability
of the class action as an efficient organizational form. But will other
courts truly read these decisions to require multiple subclasses? In Ortiz,
the dissenting judge on the Fifth Circuit panel read Amchem to mean
"that any real conflict, even if minor when compared to interests held in
common, will render the representation inadequate."68 Although this
was the dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court's subsequent reversal of
material difference in claim strength between two groups of class members, but rather as
requiring subclassing when defendants are inducing class counsel to subordinate one
group to another (here, by using one group's funds to buy another group's release).
Under this interpretation, use of a neutral or objective formula by class counsel to allocate
the settlement fund would not raise the same issues nor necessarily require separate
counsel for each subgroup.
67. For example, in one post-Amchem decision, In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc.
172 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1997), the district court certified a nationwide class that
included nine separate subclasses in order to address variations in state law. The
defendant's product was a heart pacemaker that was allegedly prone to fracture with the
result that a sharp wire within the pacemaker could then protrude and cause injury to the
heart. Some 25,000 pacemakers were installed in U.S. residents between December 1988
and February 1993, with a fracture rate that appears to have been between 12% and 20%.
See 172 F.R.D. at 277. The district court certified two medical monitoring subclasses,
which subdivided all U.S. states into three categories depending on whether the individual
jurisdiction accepted, accepted in modified form, or rejected Section 402A of the
Restatement (2d) of Torts. Id. at 293. The district court rejected still another proposed
subclass for punitive damages and also declined to further divide the class based on
potentially differing interpretations of proximate cause. See id. at 293. Hence, even more
subclasses were possible. Yet, this was ultimately a case involving only a single product and
a single prospective type of injury.
68. In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d 668, 677 (5th Cir. 1998) (Smith, J. dissenting),
rev'd, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
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the Fifth Circuit in Ortiz may make this view an accurate prophecy. In-
deed, the criterion most stressed by the Court in Ortiz as necessitating a
subclass, the expiration date of an insurance policy, would have probably
struck most trial court judges prior to Ortiz as not requiring subclassing.
To be sure, Ortiz does sense the danger in excessive subclassing, and the
majority decision notes that "at some point there must be an end to
reclassification with separate counsel. '69 But it provides no clear answer
as to where that "point" is located.
Because Ortiz implies that each subclass must have its own counsel,
its logic could make the large class action not simply unmanageable, but
uneconomical for counsel to bring on a traditional contingent fee basis.
Assume that a plaintiffs' law firm investigates and decides to bring a class
action that no other law firm has yet prosecuted. Its motivation is the
likelihood of a fee award equal to 25% to 33 1/3% of the recovery (dis-
counted, of course, by the non-trivial possibility that there will be no re-
covery). But, at the outset, assume that it also understands that Amchem
and Ortiz require that the class must be fragmented into six different sub-
classes (reflecting different injuries, applicable legal rules, and other rele-
vant variables). If we assume that each subclass requires separate counsel,
the economic consequence is that our hypothetical plaintiffs' firm must
invite five other firms into the cases to share this expected fee award with
it. The incentive to bring the action, or to search generally for meritori-
ous actions, is thereby weakened.
70
Not only is multiple counsel costly, its imposition still does not assure
adequate representation. Today, overlapping class actions are often filed,
and, if filed at the federal court level, such actions are generally consoli-
dated for pre-trial discovery purposes before a single court by the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.7 1 In these instances, the counsel in
these actions may simply decide to organize and subdivide the class ac-
tion among themselves. The alternative is open warfare over which coun-
sel is to be chosen lead counsel, and, over the years, plaintiffs' counsel
have learned that a negotiated resolution is more in their collective self-
interest than the trading of charges and counter-charges as rival coali-
tions compete for the court's favor. Pursuant to such negotiated resolu-
tion, counsel may agree to share the fee award by contract pursuant to
some negotiated formula.72 But now, the danger of collusion surfaces:
The various counsel may be sufficiently comfortable with this arrange-
69. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2320.
70. To be sure, a system of reciprocal case sharing could soon develop ("I'll invite you
into my case, if you invite me into yours"), but this only exacerbates the underlying danger
of collusion that both Amchem and Ortiz sensed and responded to by tightening the rules of
class certification.
71. See Miller, supra note 54, at 519-20; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994).
72. Such fee sharing agreements among cooperating plaintiffs' counsel in a class
action that specify how they will divide the court-awarded fee are common, but can still
sometimes produce disputes that result in litigation. See, e.g., French v. Selden, 59 F.
Supp. 2d 1152 (D. Kan. 1999).
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ment that they are not truly bargaining at arm's length on behalf of their
subclasses for purposes of Amchem and Ortiz.
Indeed, imagine a case where six plaintiffs' firms decide to file essen-
tially the same overlapping class action and, upon its eventual consolida-
tion before a districtjudge, quickly decide to divide up the necessary sub-
classes among themselves. Both to reduce risk and to minimize friction
among themselves, they also decide to pool any fees awarded to them by
the court and allocate the fee pool among themselves by contract. In-
deed, such pooling is fairly standard. 73 But at this point, is it realistic to
expect these separate law firms to bargain on behalf of their separate
subclasses over the settlement's allocation when their own fees are
pooled? At the least, it is clear that they have no economic incentive to
do so. Worse, because disputes over allocation can easily imperil the
overall settlement with defendants, each plaintiffs' counsel has a strong
incentive to achieve consensus and not disrupt the settlement by demand-
ing a larger share of the settlement for their subclass. Ultimately, their
incentive to bargain aggressively for their subclass requires that their own
economic recovery be tied to their clients' recovery-and in this exam-
ple, fee pooling severs that tie.
Hence, Amchem and Ortiz force the courts to find some balance be-
tween two opposing dangers. First, if subclassing is required for each ma-
terial legal or economic difference that distinguishes class members, the
Balkanization of the class action is threatened. Such a fragmented class
might be unmanageable, certainly would reduce the economic incentives
for legal entrepreneurs to act as private attorneys general, and could be
extremely difficult to settle if each subclass (and its attorney) had an in-
centive to hold out for more. Second, the converse danger is that sub-
classing as a remedy for class action collusion may accomplish little if
plaintiffs' attorneys for different subclasses could by pooling their fees
effectively cancel the incentives that the law means to create for them to
zealously represent their clients.
74
Each of these problems must be satisfactorily addressed before
Amchem and Ortiz can be said to have sensibly resolved the class action
problems that they have recognized. At present, Amchem and Ortiz repre-
sent an incomplete revolution in class action practices: one that unfortu-
nately has the potential to complicate and perhaps foreclose the availabil-
73. This does not mean, however, that courts will necessarily defer to such
agreements. A number of cases have refused to honor or enforce fee-sharing agreements
where they have concluded that these agreements gave rise to perverse incentives or
rewarded attorneys not actually participating in the litigation. See, e.g., In re FPI/
Agretech Sec. Litig., 105 F.3d 469, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1997); Class Plaintiffs v. Jaffe &
Schlesinger, 19 F.3d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir. 1994); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
818 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1987).
74. I do not mean to suggest that fee allocation agreements are generally suspect, but
only that they create perverse incentives when counsel for different subclasses are parties




ity of the class action in circumstances where no other legal remedy is
available, but not one that offers a clear vision of how absent class mem-
bers are to be protected. Moreover, given the inevitable divisions in the
federal and state judiciary, it is likely that the two decisions will be given
highly variant interpretations by lower courts. Conservative courts will
resist class certification in reliance on their language, while other courts
seek to accommodate settlements, except in the clearest instances of in-
tra-class conflict. A roadmap for the implementation of Amchem and Ortiz
is therefore essential.
II. BALANCING EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY IN CLASS ACTIONS
A. Loyalty: What Defines Adequate Representation?
Amchem contains two distinct, incomplete and potentially inconsis-
tent theories of adequate representation. Most evident is its idea that
"cohesion" within the class or subclass legitimizes representation that can
bind absent class members. 75 In short, only "likes" can bind "likes"-and
only when the "like" representatives "understand that their role is to rep-
resent solely the members of their respective subgroups." 76 As already
noted, this is a theory of representation that philosophers refer to "de-
scriptive representation." 77 Amchem's variation on this theory is that only
a representative who shares the narrow, parochial interests of the subclass
can be trusted to negotiate for their interests exclusively, rather than for
the general good or best interests of the entire class.
The second theory of adequacy, which is only implicitly stated in
Amchem, is that the class representative must possess leverage. The essen-
tial problem with the settlement class action, Amchem notes, is that if class
counsel could only settle and not litigate, "both class counsel and court
would be disarmed." 78 Thus, similar standards for class certification
should apply in both the settlement and litigation contexts, it said, be-
cause class counsel needed "the threat of litigation to press for a better
offer."79 Although never explicitly stated, the next step in this syllogism
would seem to be that a class counsel who lacks leverage and is therefore
disarmed cannot be an adequate representative. Unfortunately, the ma-
jority opinion can be read to undercut this clear position because it also
recognizes that the standards for a settlement class can sometimes be less
75. 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) ("[Cilass cohesion . . . legitimizes representative
action ....").
76. Id. at 627 (quoting In re joint E. and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721,
742-43 (2d Cir. 1992)), modified on reh'g sub nom., In re Findley, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1993).
77. See supra notes 10-38 and accompanying text (discussing nomenclature
proposed by Hanna Pitkin).




demanding than for a litigation class.80 However, as later discussed, it is
not necessary to read Amchem to make any concession that the representa-
tive can be "disarmed," and hence the leverage thesis remains valid.
In overview, the first theory (the cohesion thesis) is structural, while
the second (the leverage thesis) is functional. Individually, each is in-
complete for reasons next discussed.
1. The Cohesion Thesis. - The key problem with subclass cohesion as
the test of adequacy is that a representative who is entirely characteristic
of other subgroup members may still be conflicted or simply passive, apa-
thetic, and unmotivated to fight for the class's common interests. Even
holding the problem of conflicts aside, consider the case of a class mem-
ber whose entire claim is for ten dollars in a class action where two sub-
groups have claims of differing legal strength. Those in subgroup A (in-
cluding our hypothetical representative) have claims that, based on their
intrinsic legal merit, deserve a settlement payment of ten dollars, while
those in subgroup B hold claims entitling them on the same basis to a
settlement payment of only eight dollars. For reasons of rational apathy,
class counsel is inclined to avoid any allocation (because it would require
subclassing and procedural complexity) and simply average the damages
so as to award everyone nine dollars. Will our hypothetical class member
in subgroup A object to this averaging and insist on ten dollars? Not if
this representative is sane! Life is short, and the time and costly effort
that would be expended in objecting will profit each member little and
may delay (or even derail) the settlement.
A second problem with the cohesion thesis is that its historical foun-
dations are shaky. The Amchem opinion finds a principal source of the
cohesion requirement to lie in the "predominance" test of Rule
23(b) (3).81 But Rule 23(b) (3)'s requirements seem much more closely
linked to considerations of judicial efficiency than to concerns about ab-
sent class members. As next discussed, the more closely one examines
the context in which the "predominance" test was framed as part of the
1966 revisions of Rule 23, the more likely it seems that the draftsmen's
primary intent was to confine Rule 23(b) (3) within judicially manageable
limits.
Amchem's claim that the "predominance" requirement in Rule
23(b) (3) "tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to war-
rant adjudication by representation"8 2 can be traced back to earlier com-
80. Essentially, the Court said that a settlement class need not meet the
"manageability" standards that apply to a litigation class. See id. at 620. The significance
of this point is discussed infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
81. See 521 U.S. at 623. Rule 23(b) (3) requires that common issues "predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
82. 521 U.S. at 623.
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mentators, 8s but nevertheless this interpretation reads history backwards
in light of contemporary concerns. In fact, the "predominance" test was
designed to accompany an innovative and experimental extension of the
reach of the class action in 1966. Prior to that time, class actions based
solely on common questions were known as "spurious" class actions and
were permitted by Rule 23 (a)( 3 ), but these actions only bound the
named parties and others who joined in.8 4 Thus, they were based on
"opt-in" consent, rather than the failure to opt out (as current Rule
23(b) (3) operates). This shift in 1966 from an opt-in to an opt-out rule
of inclusion was obviously significant, and the Advisory Committee that
drafted Rule 23(b) (3) knew it was making a major change in the law.
Indeed, Professor Benjamin Kaplan, the Reporter to the Advisory Com-
mittee, called Rule 23(b) (3) the "most adventuresome" feature in the
1966 amendments to Rule 23.85 The Advisory Committee understood
that the new Rule 23(b) (3) was broadly designed for circumstances in
which "class-action treatment is not as clearly called for," but in which a
class suit "may nevertheless be convenient and desirable."8 6 Therefore, it
understandably added two constraints to its new creation in order to en-
sure that the revised rule did not permit all (or even most) individual
actions for money damages to be aggregated into a class action against
the same defendant.
8 7
First, the court certifying a Rule 23(b) (3) class action was required
by the term of this new provision to find that common questions of law or
fact "predominate over any questions affecting only individual members."
Second, the court had to further find that class resolution was "superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." Under the prior rule, the court had to find only that the
class sought common relief.8 8 By adding these more restrictive "predomi-
nance" and "superiority" tests, the draftsmen were seeking to assure that
certification would only be permissible in cases "in which a class action
would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, . . . without sacri-
ficing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results."8 9
In short, "predominance" and "superiority" were parallel constraints
designed to assure that their new experiment did not open the floodgates
83. Indeed, Amchem cites 7A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1777, at 518-19 (2d ed. 1986) for this proposition. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at
623.
84. 7A Wright et al., supra note 83, § 1777, at 517.
85. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 497, 497
(1969).
86. Adv. Comm. Notes, 28 U.S.C. app., 697 (1994). This language is quoted in
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615.
87. See id. at 615-16.
88. 7A Wright et al., supra note 83, § 1777, at 518.
89. Adv. Comm. Notes, 28 U.S.C. app., 697; see also Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing
Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 390 (1967).
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to an unanticipated volume of litigation in class form. So understood,
the "predominance" test seems less intended to provide due process pro-
tections for absent class members than to protect trial judges and con-
serve judicial resources.
The structure of Rule 23 reinforces this conclusion. If one were con-
cerned about the vulnerability of absent class members to collusive settle-
ments, one would not logically locate any intended protection in Rule
23(b) (3), because then it would not apply to Rule 23(b) (1) and (b) (2)
actions (which Ortiz has shown are equally vulnerable to abuse). Instead,
one would place the protection in Rule 23(a), which applies to all class
actions. In fact, this is just how Rule 23 is structured, because both the
"typicality" requirement of Rule 23(a) (3) and the "adequacy" require-
ment of Rule 23(a) (4) are clearly intended to protect absent class mem-
bers from such abuse. The logic of the "typicality" requirement, which
requires that the class representative assert claims "typical" of the class, is
that such a "typical" representative will have interests aligned with those
of other class members.
"Typicality" thus closely overlaps with the idea of "cohesion" within
the class, which suggests that it would be redundant to read the predomi-
nance test in Rule 23(b) (3) as having the same goal in mind. More im-
portantly, typicality has been long read by courts to be a far less demand-
ing test than Amchem's concept of cohesion.90 While Amchem can be read
to require identicality within the group (or subgroup) in terms of the
injury sustained and the members' legal position, typicality has tradition-
ally required only an approximate alignment of interests between the rep-
resentative and the class. As later discussed, the cost of reading cohesion
to mean identicality may be prohibitive.
These objections do not mean that Amchem was wrong in insisting on
class cohesion. Rather, they imply that class cohesion may be more a nec-
essary than a sufficient requirement. Moreover, in some contexts, it may
be a requirement for which other functional substitutes could suffice.
2. The Leverage Thesis. - The alternative suggestion in Amchem that
some degree of leverage must be possessed before a class representative
can be adequate has a number of advantages, but nonetheless is arguably
contradicted by other language in the opinion. Requiring that the repre-
sentative not be "disarmed,"9 1 and have the ability to negotiate effectively,
directly addresses the problem of collusive settlements. Such a test also
instructs the court to focus equally on class counsel as well as on the class
representative.
90. See, e.g., Forbush v.J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993) (test for
typicality is not demanding and does not require identicality); see also In re American
Med. Sys. Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1083 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that claims are typical if they
arise from the same course of conduct).
91. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621 ("[I]f a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled
certification, eclipsing Rule 23(a) and (b), and permitting class designation despite the
impossibility of litigation, both class counsel and the court would be disarmed.").
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Despite the advantages of this test, the Amchem opinion seems to take
a fundamentally inconsistent position as to whether class counsel can be
"disarmed." Although Amchem says that class counsel needs the "threat of
litigation" to negotiate effectively,9 2 the majority also agrees with the pro-
ponents of the settlement that: "Confronted with a request for settle-
ment-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the
case, if tried, would present intractable management problems."9 3 Argua-
bly, this statement tolerates a "disarmed" class counsel because it seems to
imply that a class counsel who has brought a class action that would be
too "unmanageable" for certification for litigation purposes can still settle
it as a settlement class action. Yet, if this "unmanageable" case cannot get
to trial, counsel is seemingly disarmed by definition.
Nonetheless, this seeming contradiction may be more apparent than
real. Although these two statements in Amchem exhibit some unresolved
tension, no necessary contradiction exists between them. Under some
circumstances, a class counsel who cannot proceed to trial because of an
insurmountable barrier to certification still may not be "disarmed." Con-
sider, for example, a plaintiffs' attorney who has a large inventory of indi-
vidual mass tort clients (hypothetically, 25,000 cases). These cases could
be tried individually, settled on an "inventory" basis,94 or resolved pursu-
ant to a settlement class action. The possession of an inventory gives the
attorney considerable negotiating leverage, because the claims are inher-
ently aggregated through the existence of a common agent. If the attor-
ney decided to resolve the claims of these clients pursuant to a settlement
class action, the attorney would not be "disarmed" by an inability to go to
trial in the class action, because the attorney would still have the threat of
individual litigation to enforce the attorney's negotiating position.
To be sure, these are not the facts of Amchem or Ortiz, where very
conflicted plaintiffs' attorneys settled their individual cases on an inven-
tory basis and then settled the class action on less favorable terms on
behalf of future claimants. But such a hypothetical fact pattern does
show that an attorney who cannot proceed to trial in the class action
might still possess considerable negotiating leverage. In short, the posses-
sion of leverage is not incompatible with a concession that a litigation
class cannot be certified. As a result, Amchem's focus on negotiating lever-
age does not have to be seen as contradicted by other portions of the
opinion that permit a class too "unmanageable" for trial to be certified
for settlement purposes.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 620.
94. Mass torts plaintiffs' attorneys often settle cases on an "inventory" basis-meaning
that an attorney resolves all pending individual cases that it had with the defendants
according to some overall formula. Both Amchem and Ortiz involved such inventory
settlements. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2301 (1999); Amchem, 521 U.S.
at 600. The inventory settlement involving the principal class counsel in Ortiz involved
some 53,000 claimants. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2319. The ethical issues in such inventory
settlements are analyzed in Silver & Baker, supra note 18.
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Negotiating leverage, however, should not alone make counsel an
adequate representative. As Ortiz bluntly recognized,95 the expectation
of a large fee award can leave class counsel unwilling to use the leverage
that it in fact possesses. As a result, a complete definition of "adequacy"
should contain three elements: (1) an absence of any serious conflict of
interest; (2) negotiating leverage (as shown by the ability to credibly
threaten to go to trial in some forum); and (3) the incentive to use that
leverage.
The economic incentive to use negotiating leverage exists principally
when class counsel will maximize its own recovery by maximizing the re-
covery for the class. As next discussed, class counsel may often be eco-
nomically indifferent as to whether his clients' economic position is maxi-
mized by a proposed settlement.
3. The Relevance of Fee Formulas. - Two examples involving fee award
formulas illustrate their potentially perverse impact on the attorney's in-
centives to benefit the class. First, suppose, based on Amchem's criteria,
that a class action is divided into four subclasses, each with its own coun-
sel. The four law firms are each compensated by the court under the
"lodestar" formula, which essentially multiplies each attorney's time in-
vested in the action by the attorney's normal hourly rate (and potentially
adds a risk premium to reflect the contingent nature of the fee) .96 The
result of this fee formula is that each participating attorney is now eco-
nomically indifferent as to the allocation of the settlement among the
four subclasses, because each will be paid based on their own time, not
on their success for their client. To be sure, every attorney may fulfill
their fiduciary duty to their respective subclass and bargain zealously over
the allocation of the settlement, but they have little incentive to do so.
Moreover, because most of the time expended will likely be incurred in
connection with litigating against the common foe (i.e., the defendants),
it is entirely possible for the attorney to do well, while the subclass does
poorly. In short, the interests of the attorney and the subclass are not
aligned under this fee arrangement.
Second, consider a more common variation: Class counsel is com-
pensated based on a percentage of the recovery obtained for the class,
but the court does not allocate the fee award among the counsel. In-
stead, the court either permits lead counsel for the class to allocate the
95. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2317 n.30 ("In a strictly rational world, plaintiff's counsel
would always press for the limit of what the defense would pay. But with an already
enormous fee within counsel's grasp, zeal for the client may relax sooner than it would in a
case brought on behalf of one claimant.").
96. The lodestar formula has been mandated by the Court in fee shifting cases. See
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992). However, in "common fund" cases
where the fee award comes from the settlement fund created by the litigation, the vast
majority of federal courts use the percentage of the recovery approach. See Swedish Hosp.
Corp. v. Shalala, I F.3d 1261, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A Federal Judicial Center empirical
study has found that most trial courts appear in fact to be using the percentage formula in
preference to the lodestar formula. See Willging et al., supra note 48, at 69-70.
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fee award or defers to any fee allocation agreement that was agreed to by
counsel. Again, the result is to leave class counsel rationally indifferent as
to the allocation of the settlement among the subclasses.
Although fee agreements among cooperating counsel in a class ac-
tion have many justifications, 97 the indifference that they engender to-
wards the subclass's success seems inconsistent with the concept of "ade-
quate representation." If lead counsel for the class is authorized to
allocate the fee award, lead counsel can use this power as a practical mat-
ter to bring subclass counsel into line and constrain their ability to negoti-
ate in an adversarial manner for their subclasses. Indeed, lead counsel
(or any similar authority, such as a committee of counsel appointed pur-
suant to a private agreement among class counsel) has every incentive to
use discretionary power in this fashion to ensure that intra-class bickering
does not delay or derail the settlement.
What then is the appropriate answer? Ideally, the attorney for the
subclass should be compensated based on the recovery to the subclass-
not based on the recovery to the class as a whole. Such a rule enforces
Amchem's statement that the representative must understand that its role
is to negotiate for the subclass and not the class as a whole; correspond-
ingly, each subclass, as the true client, should compensate its own attor-
ney. Because such a rule aligns the attorney's self-interest with the inter-
ests of the attorney's clients, the attorney will logically seek to maximize
the allocation of the recovery to the attorney's subclasses. Under such a
rule, however, fee-pooling agreements entered into at the outset of the
litigation among counsel for different subclasses would have to be
prohibited.
Although no court has yet connected the issue of adequacy to fee
award formulas, this failure may be because subclassing was a fairly unu-
sual procedure prior to Amchem. In any event, the connection simply
must be made. Once we realize that subclasses are in active competition
after Amchem, the need to establish a strong linkage between duty to the
subclass and payment from the subclass becomes logically unavoidable.
To illustrate, suppose a plaintiffs' attorney in a class action were to be
compensated in an amount to be determined at the discretion of the
defendants. Even the most ardent defender of the status quo would
probably acknowledge that such control by the defendants over the plain-
tiffs' attorney would compromise the latter's adequacy. Yet, if defendant
control over the fee impairs representational adequacy, precisely the
same conflict arises when one subclass (or the attorneys therefor) has the
ability to determine the compensation for any other subclass's attorneys.
After Amchem, subclasses have to be regarded as adversaries which must
bargain at arm's length.
97. For example, in a large class action involving numerous plaintiffs' attorneys (but
no subclasses), there is a strong argument that lead counsel will know far better than the
trial court which attorneys have labored productively for the class-and which have not.
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This conclusion that representational adequacy cannot be meaning-
fully analyzed apart from an analysis of economic incentives and fee for-
mulas leads, however, to a cautionary observation. If Amchem were read
to require subclassing in most class actions, based on any material differ-
ence among class members, and if subclass counsel must be compensated
based on their individual recoveries, then the settlement process may be
significantly slowed. Moreover, the prospect of the Balkanization of the
class action-namely, its division into warring fiefdoms-would be greatly
enhanced. This evaluation does not mean that subclasses are not some-
times necessary or that economic incentives can be ignored in discussing
representational adequacy; rather, it strongly suggests that a cautious ap-
proach has to be taken in determining when subclassing is required. This
topic will be returned to shortly.
B. Voice: How Much Is Desired?
It is easy enough to advance proposals to give class members greater
"voice." For example, class votes could be taken on important questions
(such as on any proposed settlement); class steering committees could be
formed; and class member participation could be maximized at every
stage. But such reforms are costly.
Moreover, the real issue is whether the majority of class members
(and not simply the occasional dissident) truly want such a voice. On the
policy level, the choice is between the uninformed democracy of class
members versus the often self-interested professionalism of plaintiffs' at-
torneys. To understand this trade-off, it is useful to begin with a focus on
how undemocratic current class action procedures actually are.
1. The "Voiceless" Representative. - One of the ironies of Amchem is the
stress it placed on the need for an unconflicted and "adequate" class rep-
resentative without any recognition of the basically trivial role currently
accorded to the class representative. Commentators have generally
agreed that the representative in a class action is more a figurehead than
an actual decisionmaker. 98 For the contending plaintiffs' counsel, a cli-
ent is a ticket of admission into the negotiations that determine lead
counsel and the composition of the plaintiffs' steering committee. Typi-
cally, counsel finds the client in order to launch its projected class action,
not the reverse.
More importantly, existing law gives the class representative very lit-
tle, if any, real authority. A dramatic example of the relative powerless-
ness of the class representative is revealed by a recent Third Circuit deci-
98. For the fullest discussion of this theme, see Macey & Miller, supra note 15, at
19-27; see also Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 Ariz. L. Rev.
923, 927 (1998) ("class representatives often are recruited by class counsel, play no client
role whatsoever, and-when deposed . . . -commonly show no understanding of their
litigation."). One exception to this generalization is, however, increasingly important: the
role of institutional investors in securities class actions as "lead plaintiffs." See infra notes
120-120 and accompanying text.
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sion, which involved the rare fact pattern in which the class
representatives were sophisticated and substantial participants in the pro-
ceeding. In Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp.,99 a dispute arose between class
counsel and three of the four class representatives who had brought a
class action, based on the Sherman Antitrust Act, against three substantial
oil companies. Each of the class representatives was a corporation or
partnership that specialized in the oil industry, and the principal repre-
sentative-Lazy Oil Co.-was described by the Third Circuit as the party
who "conceived the suit but later became disaffected with its manage-
ment and direction and ultimately with its fruits-the settlement."100
Only one of four named class representatives sided with class counsel in
favoring the settlement, and it had not participated in the original filing
of the action. 10 1
Not only did three of the four named class representatives object to
the adequacy of the settlement, but an additional 384 class members
agreed with them and filed similar objections. 10 2 In common, the objec-
tors considered the proposed settlement to be inadequate and argued
that a separate subclass should be created to reflect their different eco-
nomic position as full-time oil producing entrepreneurs because the rest
of the class consisted mainly of passive investors.10 3 Given their disap-
pointment with class counsel (whom they had originally retained), they
also moved to disqualify class counsel from representing the class because
class counsel was "now representing a party (i.e., the plaintiffs) adverse to
one they previously represented (i.e., the objectors), [thus] creating an
impermissible conflict of interest."1 0 4 Under the traditional ABA stan-
dard, such representation would justify disqualification-at least in a case
involving only individual litigants. 10 5
99. 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999).
100. Id. at 583. The district court also recognized Lazy Oil Company's decisive role by
awarding it a $20,000 incentive fee for its services as class representative. Two other class
representatives received a $5,000 incentive fee each, thus suggesting that Lazy Oil had truly
been the driving force in this class action. See Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., No. 94-110,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21397, at *105-*109 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 1997).
101. Wynnewood Drilling Associates was the only class representative to side with class
counsel. This is stated most clearly in the district court's opinion. See id. at *10. As a
result, all the representatives who originally filed the suit opposed the settlement.
102. See id. at *15. Other objectors raised still other grounds but did not appeal the
district court's decision.
103. See Lazy Oil, 166 F.3d at 583. As discussed later, this demand raises the
possibility of a holdout problem: Namely, the objectors may have wanted a larger
allocation of the settlement, which they could better bargain for if they were placed in a
separate subclass. This possibility underlines another problem with subclassing: It may be
used by organized subgroups whose legal position is not truly different from that of other
class members in order to extort a larger share of the settlement by threatening to delay or
veto the settlement. See infra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
104. Id. at 588.
105. Under the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.9(a) provides that
a "lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's
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The district court disagreed with the objectors in all respects, finding
the settlement fair, the proposed subclass unnecessary, and the asserted
conflict of interest insufficient tojustify disqualification in the class action
context. The Third Circuit affirmed, after first deciding that the appro-
priate standard for review was the very deferential standard of "clear
abuse of discretion."' 0 6 In addition, the Third Circuit panel endorsed
the district court's position that a conflict of interest that would lead to
disqualification of counsel in the context of individual litigation might
not be sufficient in the case of class action litigation.' 0 7
In overview, it is possible to find the Third Circuit's analysis persua-
sive on many of its factual conclusions and yet still feel that the broader
question has been largely missed (or politely suppressed). That question
is: What control should sophisticated class representatives have over a
class action? Can class counsel simply ignore their preferences, even
when a clear majority of the representatives wants the settlement re-
jected? Effectively, class counsel did that in Lazy Oil by resigning as coun-
sel to seventy-five percent of the class representatives (who opposed the
proposed settlement), but remaining as counsel to the fourth representa-
tive and to the class generally.
Little about this conflict between the class representatives and their
counsel, or its outcome, should be surprising. Similar conflicts have hap-
pened before and with the same ultimate outcome.' 0 8 When disputes
arise between class counsel and the class representatives over a proposed
settlement, it is likely to be the case that counsel will want to settle, while
the representatives favor rejection of the offer. Such a disagreement is
simply a specific example of the earlier noted predictable conflict over
risk between class members and their counsel. 10 9 In Lazy Oil, class coun-
sel's motives for settlement were both understandable and self-interested.
First, the litigation odds in a price-fixing class action were formidably
stacked against it because discovery had not uncovered any hard evidence
of actual collusion. Second, the proposed fee award was liberal (thirty
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client
consents after consultation." Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.9(a) (1998).
106. Lazy Oil, 166 F.3d at 587 (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices
Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 299 (3d Cir. 1998)).
107. See Lazy Oil, at 589-91.
108. Class action settlements have been approved despite even higher levels of
objections from class members and class representatives. See, e.g., County of Suffolk v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1325 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that even if the
majority of class members oppose a settlement, that fact cannot bar the approval of a
settlement that a district judge determines to be reasonable); Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley
Petroleum Co., 864 F. Supp. 1422, 1430-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 67 F.3d 1072 (2d Cir.
1995) (approving settlement despite objections of class representatives and 2,700 class
members).
109. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. One discrepancy between Lazy
Oil and the typical such conflict should be acknowledged: The class representatives in Lazy
Oil, being "professional" oil producers, were not fully diversified and hence were unlikely
to be risk neutral.
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percent of the settlement plus expenses, which brought the total payment
to counsel for fees and expenses up to a very generous forty percent of
the recovery). Finally, the objectors' theory for why greater damages
were obtainable seemed tenuous, and their request for a special subclass
made little sense. 110
All these factors made the proposed settlement seem reasonable.
Still, the key issue remains: Whose lawsuit was it? If a substantial group
of individuals sued together in a consolidated proceeding, their ability to
change counsel would seem beyond question and could not be denied
simply because their attorney was more realistic than they were about the
action's merit. Yet, the practical impact of the Third Circuit's holding in
Lazy Oil was clearly to imply that class counsel had effective control of the
class action (indeed, possibly even if all the class representatives were to
oppose the settlement). Such a result can be rationalized on the ground
that the attorney represents all class members, and not simply the repre-
sentatives, but the implicit assumption here that the rest of the class
would side with the attorney (and not the class representatives) simply
because they did not opt out or because the court approved the settle-
ment as fair and adequate assumes precisely what is to be proven.11
Such an approach makes judicial approval of the settlement's fairness the
exclusive test, and this is precisely the approach that Amchem rejected,
because it would "eclipse" the other protections of Rule 23.112
What is missing in the Third Circuit's analysis is any recognition that
some level of client disapproval may signal that the proposed settlement
is more in the attorneys' interest than that of their clients. Instead, the
Third Circuit panel reasoned that if class counsel were required to recuse
itself because it was now litigating against a former client in a closely re-
lated matter, then "not only would the objectors enjoy great 'leverage,'
but many fair and reasonable settlements would be undermined by the
need to find substitute counsel after months or even years of fruitful set-
tlement negotiations."' 1 3 This point about the excessive "leverage" that
an objector would gain if it could disqualify class counsel whenever they
disagreed over the settlement (or any other litigation issue) has some
merit, but the strength of this point is greatly reduced when a majority of
the class representatives dissent and object to the settlement. Although
individual objectors are frequent, dissent by a majority of the class repre-
110. Subclasses for professional versus passive investors seem unnecessary because
under the Sherman Act their price-fixing claims were legally equivalent.
111. As discussed later, class members did not have the opportunity to opt out in Lazy
Oil after the settlement was reached because the opt-out period had expired earlier. The
class action had been certified on June 30, 1995 and the district court had provided for a
forty-seven day opt-out period, which began on October 18, 1995, within which class
members could request exclusion from the class. See Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., No. 94-
110, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21397, at *6-*7 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 1997). The final settlement
was not reached until 1997. Id. at *9-*10.
112. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997).
113. Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 589 (3d Cir. 1999).
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sentatives is rare and probably telling. By analogy, such a case resembles
a decision by a majority of a corporation's shareholders to reject a trans-
action brought to them for ratification by their corporation's board of
directors. At a minimum, the Third Circuit panel needed to explain bet-
ter why the majority should not presumptively rule. Instead, Lazy Oil's
focus on the threatened loss of a "fruitful settlement negotiation" begs a
prior question: "fruitful" for whom? Perhaps, the settlement negotia-
tions had proven more "fruitful" for counsel than for the class.
For the future, the greater significance of Lazy Oil is that it shows
that contractual arrangements cannot be relied upon to assure the loyalty
of class counsel to the class representatives. To illustrate, assume that a
group of sophisticated corporate buyers in an antitrust class action deter-
mine to bring a price-fixing class action against one or more defendants
(much as happened in Lazy Oil). Now, however, they enter into a re-
tainer agreement with a plaintiff law firm or firms under which the law
firms will prosecute the case on a contingent fee basis, but with the addi-
tional proviso that class counsel will not enter into even a preliminary
settlement agreement with the defendants without the prior consent of a
majority of these class representatives. The class action is filed, and the
court names the retained law firm as counsel to the class. After con-
ducting negotiations with the defendants, class counsel decides that the
best settlement from its perspective is one that its clients will never ap-
prove (either because of their clients' unrealistic expectations or because
of a basic conflict over risk). 114 Accordingly, while the law firm resigns as
counsel to the class representatives, it remains counsel to the class-and
promptly enters into a settlement with the defendants. Because the court
has designated the law firm as class counsel, the law firm can apparently
act in exactly this way, justifying its actions with the claim that it owes a
duty to the class as a whole. The trial court will, of course, be required to
approve the settlement's fairness (and also the adequacy of the class rep-
resentative and class counsel). If need be, the court can also appoint a
new successor class representative.' 1 5 If experience is any guide, the trial
court will be extremely pleased that a settlement has been reached, and
will side in this dispute with the class counsel, who will present itself as
protecting the interests of the class as a whole against the "unrealistic"
114. One will never know which of these possibilities is decisive, and a legal rule that
privileged class counsel to settle based on their clients' unrealistic expectations, but not
because of risk conflicts, would be empty of content.
115. If the unanimous opposition of the class representative were thought to make a
difference (in contrast to the 75% opposition in Lazy Oil), class counsel would predictably
learn very quickly to include at least one nominal representative in the complaint who was
loyal to it. Indeed, it can always amend the complaint to do so. Interestingly, this may
have happened in Lazy Oil, because the one class representative who supported class
counsel in Lazy Oiljoined the action subsequent to the filing of the initial complaint. See
supra note 101 and accompanying text. Additional class representatives have been added
in other controversial cases. See County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d
1295, 1322 (2d Cir. 1990).
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demands of the original class representatives. Hence, the court will over-
rule the original class representatives, just as it normally overrules objec-
tors. The bottom line then is that in class action practice the lawyers
decide and the clients are relatively powerless.
There is an additional nuance that further reduces the class repre-
sentative's power. Suppose a class representative objects to the settle-
ment and retains one of the prior class counsel to represent it (perhaps, a
long-standing client relationship will lead the law firm to follow its client
and represent it as an objector). Even prior to Lazy Oil, the case law
strongly suggests that the remaining attorneys for the class can disqualify
this law firm from serving as counsel for its client, the objector, because
of its prior representation of the class. This was the outcome in In re Corn
Derivatives Antitrust Litigation.1 6 As a result, there is a one-way ratchet
effect here: Class counsel can remain in the action if it falls out with its
client, but if class counsel switches with its client to represent objectors, it
stands an excellent chance of disqualification, based on the same prior
representation.
2. The Difficulty of Compromise. - What degree of control should the
class representatives have over class counsel-if any? Few would argue
that a class representative should have absolute control over class counsel,
who after all owes an overriding duty to the entire class. Even an uncon-
flicted class representative may have an idiosyncratic or overly optimistic
view of the merits of the case, whereas class counsel, having far more
experience, understands the inevitable risks and uncertainties in litiga-
tion. In addition, when class counsel is in effect financing the action by
advancing litigation expenses and accepting a contingent fee, its eco-
nomic stake in the litigation may dwarf that of the class representatives.
Realistically, one cannot expect an unsecured creditor to be as docile as
an agent paid on an hourly basis.
Still, the more that one despairs of a model of "descriptive represen-
tation," the more it becomes appropriate to consider whether greater ac-
countability could result from a "formal representation" model.'
17
Under such a model, contractual agreements between the counsel and
the class representatives might attempt to structure a reasonable compro-
mise. For example, a contract between class counsel and the class repre-
sentatives might provide that in the event of a dispute over the adequacy
of a proposed settlement, the class representatives should have the right
to replace the class counsel (with a successor counsel satisfactory to the
court), and that the original class counsel should then be entitled to im-
116. 748 F.2d 157, 160-62 (3d Cir. 1984). But see Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins.
Co., 861 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988) (refusing to disqualify objector's counsel on
somewhat different facts).
117. As noted earlier, Professor Pitkin distinguishes between "formal," "descriptive,"
and "symbolic" representation. Pitkin, supra note 14, at 112-43. The real issue in her
terminology is how to move from any of these categories to "substantive representation" in
which the agent truly "acts for" the constituency.
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mediate repayment of the litigation expenses that it had advanced and to
eventual payment of a reasonable contingent fee based on the originally
proposed settlement (if an equivalent or greater recovery were ever ob-
tained). Hypothetically, if the proposed settlement were for $10,000,000
and successor counsel eventually won a settlement of $16,000,000, the
original counsel might be entitled to a fee equal to 25% of the
$10,000,000 settlement it earned plus interest from the time of the initial
settlement (while successor counsel might be entitled to an even larger
percentage of the difference between $10,000,000 and $16,000,000, given
the greater risk that it assumed).
At first glance, this arrangement may seem to balance fairly the inter-
ests of both counsel and the class representative, because it does not re-
quire the initial class counsel to finance a long-shot action that class coun-
sel believed was too risky for its taste and it permits the class
representative to replace the attorney. Still, this compromise is unlikely
to please class counsel because it requires it to expose its expected fee
award under the proposed settlement to the risk that successor counsel
will lose the case. In effect, class counsel is asked to trade a "bird in the
hand" for a more risky "bird in the bush" that will at least be delayed and
may never be caught. Second, it may be impossible to compensate the
successor counsel adequately out of the balance of the settlement fund-
at least without depleting it unreasonably.
118
Thus, even if the foregoing retainer arrangement between the class
representatives and class counsel were enforceable, it would be a solution
to a problem that would rarely arise. As a practical matter, the class rep-
resentatives will rarely be willing to finance the action themselves (or to
reimburse the expenses of a counsel they wish to replace). Client financ-
ing of the action is highly unlikely because of the inherent collective ac-
tion problem in class actions; that is, a class representative who expects to
receive one percent (or less) of the recovery will not logically finance one
hundred percent of the action's costs. Even a larger team of class repre-
sentatives would still face a substantial shortfall between its expected pay-
off and the risky investment that it would have to make if the price of
control over the action is financing its progress.
Both because of these collective action problems and because the
original counsel will not wish to risk its fee award under the proposed
settlement, class counsel will predictably argue to the trial court that its
proposed settlement is in the "best interests" of the entire class, and char-
118. For example, suppose the initial proposed settlement is for $10,000,000 and the
class representatives reject it and obtain successor counsel who after two years' work
obtains a recovery of $12,000,000 from a jury. Successor counsel would be unlikely to
accept this role without some assurance of substantial compensation if successful. If the
original counsel receives 25% of the $10,000,000 initial recovery and the successor counsel
negotiates a similar fee, then roughly half the recovery goes to the attorneys. This is not




acterize the dissident class representatives (much like the traditional ob-
jector) as either unrealistic or as reflecting personal interests. Given the
strong preference of most trial courts for settlement, it is a safe bet that
class counsel will win most of these disputes. Indeed, the evidence shows
that Lazy Oil is far from unique, and class action settlements have been
approved in the face of high levels of opposition from class members and
even the united opposition of the class representatives.' 1 9
The bottom line then is that class counsel is and will remain the sov-
ereign of the class action with the class representative being largely a titu-
lar figurehead. In turn, this means that only modest hopes can be placed
on proposals to enhance voice as a means of protecting class members.
Thus, although some commentators have proposed expanded rights for
all class members to intervene and participate in class action decisions,
120
the result of such reforms is likely to be modest at best. Amidst the
cacophony of multiple voices, the trial court will as usual favor those argu-
ing for approval of the proposed settlement.
3. When Will Voice Work? - If class counsel cannot be effectively re-
stricted by contract and if the trial court will predictably favor the propo-
nents of settlement over class members who would prefer to hold out,
does this imply that class members lack any means of effective control
over their nominal agent, the class counsel? Although the implications
that flow from these tendencies are certainly pessimistic, it does not truly
follow that a greater role for voice cannot be implemented in representa-
tive litigation. The one factor that gives class members some degree of
control is that they are sometimes repeat players who will be recurrently
involved in such actions. To the extent that they will repetitively retain
class counsel, counsel will be constrained from pursuing their own self-
interest by the desire to secure future employment. The clearest example
of this phenomenon arises in securities litigation, where the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") creates a presumption
that the class representative (or "lead plaintiff' in its terminology) should
presumptively be the class member or members who have the largest
stake in the action.121 The PSLRA further provides that this lead plaintiff
shall "select" the class counsel (subject to judicial approval). If such a
lead plaintiff system applied to antitrust litigation, it would have meant
that Lazy Oil, as the largest shareholder, would have been presumptively
entitled to select counsel for the class in Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp.
119. See cases discussed supra note 108.
120. See Woolley, supra note 19. I do not mean to indicate opposition to Professor
Woolley's proposals, but only skepticism as to their likely impact.
121. The PSLRA directs the court to "appoint as lead plaintiff the member or
members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of
adequately representing the interests of class members." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i)
(Supp. IV 1998). The PSLRA then creates a "[r]ebuttable presumption ... that the most
adequate plaintiff... is the person or group of persons that.., in the determination of the
court, has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class." Id. § 78u-
4 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (1).
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Still, one must be realistic about the actual impact of such a provi-
sion. In Lazy Oil, the class member with seemingly the largest stake in the
action did select class counsel-but class counsel later rebelled and nego-
tiated its own settlement which it probably knew would elicit the opposi-
tion of the client that retained it. Could this happen in the context of
securities class actions as well? The PSLRA is silent as to whether the lead
plaintiff has any ability to dismiss the counsel it retains, and once the
court names this counsel as counsel for the class, it is arguable that the
lead plaintiff lacks the power thereafter to replace that counsel with an-
other counsel satisfactory to the court.
Still, the institutional investor has another and more important
source of influence. Because institutional investors hold enormous port-
folios of securities, they are well positioned to act as lead plaintiff in most
securities class actions. They are thus repeat players who will have the
opportunity again and again to select class counsel. This source of power
may maintain the loyalty of any class counsel who wants to be selected by
that institution in other actions in the future. Reinforcing this tendency
is the fact that only a relatively small population of institutional inves-
tors-chiefly the largest public pension funds-have been willing to serve
as lead plaintiffs. 122 Hence, the practical ability to select class counsel in
securities class actions belongs to a relatively small and close-knit popula-
tion of interacting public pension funds.
Nonetheless, the early experience under the PSLRA has revealed
that even this legislatively-granted power to institutional investors to serve
as lead plaintiffs has often elicited a hostile judicial reaction. Put simply,
some trial judges have gone to considerable lengths to nullify this power
to select class counsel. Initially, the traditional plaintiffs' bar sought to
resist institutional investor control by aggregating the claims of individual
investors and presenting this loose-knit grouping of individuals to the
court as a rival candidate for the position of lead plaintiff.12 3 For exam-
ple, a hundred individual investors each owning small amounts might col-
lectively own more stock in the defendant than any single institution. If
they were designated lead plaintiff, they could then select the law firm
that organized them into this group as class counsel. Some courts and
the SEC have resisted this attempt to aggregate the claims of unaffiliated
122. For early reviews of the performance of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs,
see Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 Ariz. L. Rev.
533 (1997); Keith L. Johnson, Deterrence of Corporate Fraud Through Securities
Litigation: The Role of Institutional Investors, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 155 (1997);
Elliott J. Weiss, Comment: The Impact To Date of the Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 561 (1997).
123. The first of these now recurring disputes arose in Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F.
Supp. 542 (N.D. Tex. 1997). There, the State of Wisconsin Investment Board ("SWIB")
was appointed lead plaintiff, where its ownership clearly exceeded that of the individual
plaintiffs, who had been brought together by a traditional plaintiffs' law firm (Milberg,




individual investors, arguing that the PSLRA intended to substitute client
control over securities class actions for the prior patterns of attorney-
driven class actions.124 At present, courts remain divided about the pro-
priety of such aggregation of unaffiliated individuals.
In any event, another and superior tactic for neutralizing the lead
plaintiff concept has been perfected: The court can appoint multiple
lead plaintiffs, each of whom then predictably appoints its own counsel,
and the collection of class counsel thus assembled thereafter operates by
majority vote. 12 5 For example, suppose a large institutional investor owns
2% of the outstanding securities in the class and the next two largest
investor groups (each a collection of individual investors assembled by
different traditional plaintiffs' law firms) owns 0.05% each. If the court
appoints all three as lead plaintiffs and each selects its usual law firm, the
result is that investors holding 0.1% effectively outvote the institutional
investor who owns 2% (or twenty times their stake in the action).126
Why would a trial court manipulate the PSLRA in this fashion to
nullify the seeming intent of the lead plaintiff concept? Although differ-
ent courts may have different motives, the most likely explanation is that
trial courts understand and welcome the fact that the traditional plain-
tiffs' firms tend to settle early and avoid protracted litigation. 127 Such a
124. See, e.g., In re Donnkenny Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 157-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (finding that unrelated individuals cannot constitute a lead plaintiff and have their
shares aggregated for purposes of the PSLRA's lead plaintiff proxism). Other courts have
refused to permit multiple lead plaintiffs on the ground that they will be unable to control
class counsel. See In re Advanced Tissue Sciences Sec. Litig., 184 F.R.D. 346, 352 (S.D. Cal.
1998); In re Milestone Scientific Sec. Litig., 183 F.R.D. 404, 417 (D.N.J. 1998). At least one
court and the SEC have taken the position that "ordinarily ... no more than three to five
persons" should be aggregated as a group, because in its view a larger group would not "be
capable of effectively managing the litigation and the lawyers." In re the Baan Co. Sec.
Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214, 216-17 (D.D.C. 1999). The SEC's standard amicus brief on this
issue is attached as an appendix to the Baan decision. See id. app. at 218-35.
125. This is the fact pattern in In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D.
42 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). There, ColPERA, The Colorado Public Employee's Retirement
Association, was found by the court "to have suffered the largest financial loss, followed by
the Vogel plaintiffs and the PBHG Funds." Id. at 44. ColPERA suffered losses of over $19
million. See id. The Vogel group consisted of individuals who collectively suffered losses
ofjust over $10 million, while the PBHG Funds alleged losses of $2.756 million. See id. at
44-45. Thus, the losses to Vogel and the PBHG Funds, when added together, were well
below the losses to CoIPERA. Nonetheless, the court appointed all three as lead plaintiffs
and permitted each to select their counsel as class counsel. See id. at 49-50. The net
effect was to make ColPERA the equivalent of a minority shareholder, who could be
outvoted by the other two.
126. In reality, this example is only a more extreme version of the actual outcome in
the Oxford Health litigation. See id.
127. Indeed, in Oxford Health, the trial court noted that "[a]n overwhelming
percentage of securities class actions are settled" and cited data indicating that 87.6% of
securities class actions filed from April 1988 through September 1996 "ended in
settlement." 182 F.R.D. at 47 n.5. Although securities class actions may be distinctive in
some respects, they typically involve higher attorney fee awards than other class actions.
This means that the asymmetry in the stakes between the plaintiffs' attorney and the
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tendency makes economic sense. If we model the class action as a negoti-
ating game between the plaintiffs' attorney and the defendants, then it
follows that there is a basic asymmetry in the stakes. That is, the tradi-
tional plaintiffs' attorney expects a contingent fee that is likely to equal
approximately one third of the recovery while in contrast the defendants
are motivated by the threatened loss of the entire recovery or settlement
(which by definition is three times greater). This imbalance in the stakes
gives the defendants, who fear a loss that is a multiple of the plaintiffs'
attorneys' gain, greater incentive to invest resources in the action. 12 8 In
turn, this imbalance implies that the plaintiffs' attorney will under-invest
(on a relative basis) and wish to settle earlier.
The irony is that the more loyal the class attorney is to the interests
of the class, the more the attorney is likely to impose a greater burden on
the trial court by resisting an early settlement. Thus, to the extent that
institutional investors serving as lead plaintiffs secure more "loyal" coun-
sel, the asymmetry in the stakes is reduced, but as a result the court faces
a greater burden from such an action that is less likely to settle early. The
bottom line is that the trial court therefore has a rational incentive to
oppose the appointment of the more "loyal" class counsel selected by in-
stitutional investors.
To be sure, other explanations for resisting the appointment of insti-
tutional investors as lead plaintiffs can be given. Perhaps, some district
courts have doubted the competence or skill of the plaintiffs' attorneys
retained by institutional investors, whose attorneys have generally not
been members of the traditional securities plaintiffs' bar. Thus, the court
may prefer to appoint multiple law firms as lead counsel to assure ade-
quate experience. Understandable as this concern may be, the early ex-
perience with public pension funds as lead plaintiffs actually indicates
that the settlements obtained by institutional lead plaintiffs have been
above average. 12 9 In any event, whether the dominant motivation has
been judicial caution or a desire for early settlements, federal trial courts
have initially resisted the lead plaintiff concept.130 This suggests that
other efforts to shift control of class action litigation, even marginally,
from attorneys to their clients may encounter similar resistance.
defendants' is even more pronounced than in other class actions and even more likely to
elicit early settlements. See infra notes 128-120 and accompanying text.
128. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 15, at 686-90
(1986).
129. See Jay W. Eisenhofer & Abbott W. Leban, The Lead Plaintiff Provision: Does It
Work?, Corp. Governance Advisor, May-June 1999, at 9, 14 (citing data in only the first two
lead plaintiff cases to result in settlement).
130. More recently, however, federal courts have begun to resist the use of large
aggregations of individual class members as lead plaintiffs. For the most recent indication
of this trend, see Mitchell v. Complete Management, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 1454, 1999 U.S. Dist.




To be sure, other mechanisms for enhancing voice can also be envi-
sioned that may be less susceptible to judicial nullification, but they also
encounter severe problems. Voting is probably the most obvious means
of according voice to class members. In principle, one could require
class member ratification of the proposed settlement (much as is done
with a proposed plan of reorganization in bankruptcy). But not only
would such a change require legislative action, its feasibility also seems
doubtful. Critical differences exist between the bankruptcy and class ac-
tion contexts. First, in bankruptcy, the creditors are generally known,
and their claims have been liquidated; as a result, it is feasible to solicit
them. The reverse is true in the class action setting, where by definition
the claims have not been reduced to judgment.
Second, the traditional class action aggregates small claims that are
individually uneconomical to litigate. Small claimants have little incen-
tive to vote. Thus, not only will these small claimants be hard to identify
or contact, but they have little reason to respond to any solicitation. In
turn, this implies a low turnout and referenda that might be decided by
only a small percentage (say two to three percent) of the potential electo-
rate. This means that active electioneering and public relations cam-
paigns by the settling parties are likely to be more determinative of the
outcome than in a high turnout election. A related problem is agenda
manipulation. Much depends on who will frame the question on which
class members will vote. The obvious candidates are the settling parties
or the court, but both share a preference for settlement over litigation.
Next, campaign finance is a critical factor in all elections, and objectors
lack both the organization or incentives to match the expenditures that
the settling parties will predictably incur to achieve a favorable vote.
Ultimately, the concept of class member referenda most clearly fails
because of a collective action problem: A one percent class member will
not incur the same expenditures to reject a proposed settlement that
shortchanges this class member as the defendants will bear in order to
economize on their settlement costs. In short, to make voting work,
someone has to have sufficient incentives to organize the opposition. As
will be suggested later, only a rival team of plaintiffs' attorneys seem likely
to have the incentives to undertake this task.
C. Exit: Toward Client Autonomy
Client autonomy-the idea that the attorney should abide by the cli-
ent's preferences and litigation goals-is the baseline norm of legal eth-
ics. 1 31 But, as already indicated, in representative litigation it is a rule
honored more in the breach than in the observance. Moreover, it is also
a norm that can only be incompletely realized at best in representative
131. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (1998) ("A lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation . .. [subject to
specified exceptions]."). See infra note 138 for a fuller discussion of this rule.
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litigation where the attorney is not simply an agent of the client. Rather,
the attorney is also the creditor and joint venturer who is effectively fi-
nancing their common undertaking and has much more at stake then
any individual class member. This section will explore the degree to
which client autonomy can and cannot be realized under these
circumstances.
1. A Hypothetical Bargaining Approach. - If class counsel and disinter-
ested class representatives are unlikely in fact to agree on terms that per-
mit the class to fire and replace its counsel in the manner that an ordi-
nary client can replace its attorney, this does not mean that other kinds of
bargains could not be struck if it were possible for the attorney and the
class to negotiate on a fully informed basis. Although such bargaining is
hypothetical,1 3 2 rather than real, public policy might be sensibly guided
by examining the kind of "hypothetical bargain" that such parties would
reach, given their divergent interests.
In this hypothetical world, the class counsel would understand the
following facts: (1) the class likely would be considerably more risk neu-
tral than its counsel; (2) at least some class members would have unrealis-
tic expectations; and (3) some class members would desire a degree of
emotional and public vindication for their grievances that was either un-
realistic or simply counterproductive to the attorney's desire to maximize
the financial recovery. Thus, the attorney would rationally fear that the
class might want to free ride on the attorney's efforts and gamble on a
long-shot recovery based on the effectively free financing for the action
that the attorney was providing.
Conversely, rational class members would fear that class counsel
would behave in a risk-averse fashion and settle the action at an amount
well below the level that a more aggressive and risk neutral agent could
negotiate. They would further understand that the more time the attor-
ney invested in the action and the more funds the attorney advanced for
expenses, the more the attorney logically would become risk averse. The
class would also recognize that there were enormous possibilities for la-
tent conflicts of interest to cloud their counsel's judgment and distort
counsel's incentives.
In short, neither side can take much comfort from its assessment of
the other's inclinations and incentives. Thus, the basic message is that
neither side can regard the other as a natural partner with fully compati-
ble interests and expectations. What then can they agree upon? Basi-
cally, they could agree on protections so that neither side could be ex-
ploited by the other.
Motivated by a contingent fee, class counsel would particularly not
want to risk being replaced by a successor counsel if class members
132. For a discussion of hypothetical bargaining, see David Charny, Hypothetical




elected to take a long-shot gamble on trial. Class counsel's rational fear
would be that after it had funded the action for years, it might be re-
placed on the brink of trial and victory, because it rationally counseled
caution.13 3 Class members in turn would fear that plaintiffs' counsel, the
defendants, and a trial court that was usually inclined to prefer settlement
over trial might conspire to strike a deal that ignored the class's own
preferences.
Given these rational fears, both sides should recognize that they
needed a right to effect a divorce of their de facto partnership when their
interests conflict (as they legitimately can conflict). The most sensible
response to this recognition would be to permit a "no fault" divorce that
did not require proof of culpability or fiduciary misconduct. How would
they achieve this? One answer would be to negotiate reciprocal rights to
exit the class action. Viewing their situation ex ante, rational class mem-
bers would want to maximize their right to opt out if the settlement
struck them as overly cheap. Correspondingly, class counsel would want
the right to avoid conscription by a class intent on utilizing the counsel's
funds and efforts in order to take a long-shot gamble at trial. Hence,
both sides would agree that each could call the partnership off if their
interests deviated. For class members, this means a right to opt out. For
class counsel, this implies some right to recover even if the class repre-
sentatives want to utilize a different strategy and a different attorney.
Against this backdrop, a central contention of this Article is that
"exit" is more likely to be effective than "voice."1 34 But the right to exit
today is often compromised or eclipsed by a variety of stratagems that the
settling parties use to minimize opt outs. Reform is thus needed. In addi-
tion, as next will be suggested, exit and voice can be combined in ways
that make each more effective.
2. Protecting Exit. - Because collective action problems confound
voice, the more feasible route to client autonomy may lie in enhancing
the right to exit. To understand why, it is useful to return to the facts in
Lazy Oil.' 35 Arguably, the real problem in Lazy Oil was that the objecting
class members were already locked into the class action and could not opt
out when a settlement that they regarded as unsatisfactory was an-
nounced. As the District Court's opinion makes clear, the Lazy Oil class
was certified as a Rule 23(b) (3) class action pursuant to an order entered
on June 30, 1995, and a settlement notice, dated September 27, 1995, was
133. If traditional legal ethics govern, the law of many states gives the client the right
to fire the attorney at any time. See Covington v. Rhodes, 247 S.E.2d 305 (N.C. App. Ct.
1978); Hiscott & Robinson v. King, 626 A.2d 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); see also Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16 cmt. (1998) ("A client has a right to discharge a
lawyer at anytime, with or without cause .... ").
134. This conclusion is limited to class actions primarily seeking money damages,
where the class's interests are linked by their joint desire to reduce transaction costs and
increase leverage. Where the action primarily seeks non-pecuniary goals, "voice" may well
be the preferred checking mechanism by which to control attorney opportunism.
135. See supra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
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mailed to class members that gave class members forty-seven days to re-
quest exclusion from the class. 13 6 Yet, the settlement agreement that
aroused the ire of objectors was not entered into by counsel until January,
1997, nearly fourteen months after the deadline to opt out from the class
had expired. 137 Although no indication exists that counsel deliberately
delayed the Lazy Oil settlement's disclosure until after the class members
could not escape it, plaintiffs' counsel does have precisely such an incen-
tive-because opt-outs reduce the size of the settlement (and thus their
expected fee if it is calculated on the normal percentage of the recovery
basis) and may even imperil the settlement if the number of objectors are
significant.
In this light, the simplest means of assuring the right to exit would be
to delay the opt-out deadline until after at least the approval of the pro-
posed settlement. Otherwise, by placing the opt-out deadline first, coun-
sel is in a position to impose a settlement upon the class that may be
unsatisfactory to it. Defendants have every reason to join this conspiracy,
and even the trial court has an incentive to acquiesce in any tactic that
minimizes opt-outs because opt-outs pose a serious problem for the court
and may even require it to try the same case on an individual basis that it
had just seemingly settled on a class basis.
Operationally, a right to exit could be implemented either by delay-
ing class certification to the time of settlement approval (which is in fact a
common pattern today) or by granting an additional, delayed opt-out
right that begins upon the approval of the settlement. Of these two
choices, the second is clearly preferable because the plaintiffs' attorney
has an obvious reason for seeking early class certification: It increases
plaintiff's leverage over the defendant by removing one of the principal
litigation uncertainties. The additional opt-out period would only arise if
a settlement were reached, meaning that if the defendants were able to
obtain a dismissal on the merits after the action was initially certified,
then all class members would be bound. Although judicial rules could be
used to implement this approach, another means of implementation
could be legal ethics. Ultimately, the attorney should be regarded as hav-
ing a fiduciary duty to the class members to take all feasible steps to per-
mit them to decide for themselves whether to accept a proposed settle-
ment or opt out in light of it.1 38
136. See Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., No. 94-1110, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21397, *6-*7
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 1997).
137. See id. at *10.
138. Legal ethics is deeply imbued with the idea that the client should be enabled by
the attorney to make an individual choice with respect to important litigation decisions,
including the acceptance or rejection of a settlement. Thus, Rule 1.2 (a) of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct specifies: "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation," subject to certain carefully defined
exceptions in paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of the Rule. See Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (1998).
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Simple as this answer may sound, it will predictably not please any of
the contending parties in a case like Lazy Oil. First, it will be resisted by
the defendants because it could undercut the value of their settlement by
forcing them to relitigate the same case with a substantial number of indi-
vidual opt-outs. Defendants do, however, have a contractual remedy:
They can provide that the settlement agreement is terminated if more
than a specified number or percentage of class members opt out. Such
provisions are common in settlement agreements, but rarely, if ever, are
exercised.1 3 9 Beyond this right to avoid being trapped in an empty or
depleted class action settlement, it is difficult to see why defendants have
any other valid objections to allowing class members to "vote with their
feet" on the attractiveness of the settlement.
Class counsel will, of course, be unhappy with any proposed reform
that increases the number of opt-outs because opt-outs potentially reduce
their likely fee award. By the same token, however, this reform disci-
plines class counsel by threatening them with reduced fees if they pro-
pose a settlement that is unattractive to their clients. More surprising
perhaps is the strong likelihood that the class representatives, such as
those that objected in Lazy Oil, will also find this proposed reform unsatis-
factory. In reality, what objectors often want is control over the class ac-
tion (not merely the right to exit it) because control of the class gives
them negotiating leverage with the defendants. That is, defendants who
are reluctant to litigate a billion dollar class action (as in Lazy Oil) might
be quite ready to litigate the same, but smaller, claims of large individual
class members. That objectors want this leverage does not mean, how-
ever, that they are entitled to it. In any event, those who opt out could
potentially bring an opt-out class action or sue on a consolidated basis, in
either case giving themselves additional leverage.
Perhaps the greatest benefit of such a delayed opt-out rule is its ex
ante impact on the original plaintiffs' counsel. Knowing that class mem-
bers can flee an inadequate or unattractive settlement, they have less in-
centive to enter one (at least to the extent that their expected fee award
will decline); and defendants will also be less prepared to settle on such a
basis. Today, as Lazy Oil illustrates, class counsel can sometimes force
class members to buy the proverbial "pig in a poke" by resolving class
As a specific illustration, Rule 1.2(a) adds: "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter." Id.
The attorney is also expected to keep the client reasonably informed and explain
matters "to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions concerning the representation." Id. Rule 1.4(b). Of course, in a class action, the
class member does not receive the opportunity to instruct the attorney, but the general
obligation to inform the client in order that the client might decide its own best interests is
most appropriately satisfied in this context by recognizing a specific obligation not to lock
the client into an action by permitting the opt-out period to expire prior to settlement.
139. For the rare case in which such a termination provision based on an excessive
number of opt-outs became applicable, but even then was waived by the defendants, see
Presidential Life Ins. Co. v. Milken, 946 F. Supp. 267, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
2000]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
certification before any settlement is reached. Once the class is locked
in, the only remaining protection for class members is the possibility that
objectors can convince the court not to approve the settlement. This sel-
dom happens.
One skeptical response to this proposed reform is that, while it may
be desirable, it will make little difference. Many class actions today are
resolved through simultaneous class certification and settlement approval
hearings, and yet few class members opt out. What explains low opt-out
rates? The best explanation is probably rational apathy: Small claimants
who have only modest claims and no real alternative because their claims
are typically too small to litigate on an individual basis will simply not
bother to opt out. More then is needed, before a right to exit is by itself
an effective remedy. In particular, as next discussed, a practical means
needs to be developed to aggregate the dissidents, because typically only
an aggregation has leverage.
3. Developing A Market For Exit. - The potential for enhanced ac-
countability in class actions can probably best be assessed by contrasting
class action procedures with the comparable accountability mechanisms
in corporate law. Strong analogies exist. In the corporate context, the
principal/agent relationship between shareholders and managers can
also become strained, as managers either shirk their responsibilities or
pursue their own self-interests at the expense of their shareholders. Simi-
larly, both exit and voice are potential remedies in corporate law (along
with litigation against faithless agents). However, over the last three de-
cades, one market-based remedy has come to overshadow all others: the
hostile takeover. If corporate management underperforms and the price
of its company's shares declines, the most likely consequence will not be
litigation for breach of fiduciary duties (although that may happen also),
but rather a takeover bid from another company that effectively invites
the target's shareholders to exit the target company at a lucrative pre-
mium. Often, such a takeover bid is combined with a proxy contest to
replace the target company's incumbent board-thereby combining
voice and exit, but essentially seeking to effect a change in control of the
underperforming corporation.
Although an exact analogy cannot be drawn between the class action
and corporate governance contexts for a variety of reasons, the idea of a
competitive bid has considerable relevance to the class action context.
Today, the plaintiffs' counsel who wish to contend for control of the class
can do so only at two junctures: (1) They can seek to become class coun-
sel, which typically depends upon the support of the other plaintiffs' at-
torneys in the action or the favorable disposition of the trial court; or (2)
They can object to any proposed settlement and seek to convince the
court that the settlement is so inadequate that it should replace the origi-
nal class counsel. This latter tactic may be often followed, but it rarely
works. Understandably, the court will tend to prefer the known counsel
to potential, but unknown, substitutes.
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In overview, there are two basic problems with current accountability
procedures: First, the competition is for the support of either other
plaintiffs' attorneys or the court, but not that of the class members them-
selves. Second, the dissident objector is a poor champion of class action
accountability. Primarily, this is because the objector's attorney can re-
ceive a fee award only when the objector's efforts "improve" the settle-
ment, but not when the objector's efforts cause the court to reject the
settlement or decline to certify the class. This creates an obvious incen-
tive for the objector to "pull his punch" and prefer revision over objec-
tion; as a result, the settling parties know that objectors can often be
bribed by offering cosmetic improvements to the settlement which they
can attribute to the objector's efforts in order to justify a fee award to the
objector's attorney. Even when the objector spurns these proposals and
seeks to be appointed class counsel, this effort is unlikely to be successful,
because the objector is simply seeking too much: namely, control of the
entire class, including the vast majority of class members who have ex-
pressed no view on the action (and may be unaware of its existence). The
more modest and practical alternative would be for counsel to solicit dis-
satisfied class members to opt into a parallel class action filed by it, but
consisting only of those class members who wish to opt out of the original
class action. Essentially, this proposal responds to the collective action
problems that disable individual shareholders by employing en-
trepreneurially motivated attorneys to organize the opposition. But the
goal of this solicitation is to increase client autonomy by placing the criti-
cal decision in the hands of class members; in turn, this forces the rival
counsel to compete by signaling their loyalty to the class. Such signals
could take a variety of forms: an offer to take a lower fee award or an
offer to make their fee contingent on obtaining a superior settlement
than that already obtained. At a minimum, class members are likely to
find such a competition far more attractive than simply the prospect of
opting out and bringing a possibly uneconomical individual action. In
effect, such a solicitation is the equivalent of a hostile tender offer be-
cause it asks class members to "vote with their feet" and leave one class
action to join another.1
40
Operationally, the optimal time for the counter-solicitation is after a
tentative settlement has been reached. Then, at one multi-phase hearing,
the court could evaluate the certifiability of the class, the adequacy of the
proposed settlement, and the accuracy of the disclosures and assertions
made in the objecting class counsel's rival solicitation. Thereafter, a rea-
sonable period of time-say thirty to forty-five days from mailing-would
elapse during which class members would consider whether to opt out
and, if so, whether to join the rival class proposed (or already filed) by
140. In truth, the more exact analogy is to a hostile equity exchange offer in which
one bidder offers to exchange its shares with the shareholder for those of the target. This
is because the class member is still very much subject to risk, while the shareholder who
accepts a cash tender offer is no longer subject to the risks of the enterprise.
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the insurgent class counsel. In effect, the contest would resemble rival
proxy solicitations, except that there would be no attempt to vote out the
incumbent team of class counsel, but only to encourage dissatisfied class
members to opt out and join a rival class action. Such an approach maxi-
mizes individual choice, recognizing that inevitably some class members
may be satisfied with a proposal settlement, while some may not. More-
over, this approach neither threatens the finality of settlements nor en-
courages collateral attacks on the class settlement.1 '" Viewed in terms of
the policy options, this approach provides a more feasible alternative to a
broad right to attack class action settlements collaterally.
142
The deeper premise here is that the best remedy for collusion is
competition. If plaintiffs' counsel and defendants have struck a "sweet-
heart deal" that shortchanges class members, the more feasible remedy is
not to dismiss class counsel, but to invite class members to "vote with their
feet" and join a rival class. The competitive solicitations would have to be
monitored by the court (just as the SEC monitors rival proxy solicitations
for full and fair disclosure). But once adequate disclosure was made,
class members would be empowered to choose the action into which they
would opt. The net result would be to induce competing counsel to find
credible means by which to bond with their clients.
How is this proposal different from a shareholder vote over the selec-
tion of lead counsel (which was earlier dismissed as impractical)? Basi-
cally, this approach rejects the idea of the attorney's deciding the best
interests of the class members as their fiduciary in favor of maximizing
client choice so that different class members can select different options.
Put simply, there may be no single best solution for all class members,
given their different attitudes toward risk and different litigation objec-
tives. Essentially, a competitive solicitation enables class members to self-
segregate into those who are willing to accept greater risk and those who
are not (with the former opting into the opt-in insurgent class and the
remainder staying with the original class). Moreover, in contrast to a vote
on the selection of lead counsel at the outset of the litigation, class mem-
bers at this later stage would be better informed and better motivated
141. This approach would not imperil the finality of settlements because the remedy
for a false or misleading solicitation would be a fraud or malpractice action against the
attorney, not a collateral attack on the settlement. See Durkin v. Shea & Gould, 92 F.3d
1510 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a court-approved settlement of shareholder derivative
action does not preclude a subsequent action for attorney malpractice).
142. The ability of a dissatisfied class member to attack a class action settlement on
grounds of inadequate representation is in serious question after the Ninth Circuit's final
resolution of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 497
(1999). Originally, the Ninth Circuit had invalidated a class action settlement reached in
the Delaware Chancery Court on grounds of inadequate representation, see Epstein v.
MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1997), but withdrew its decision following re-argument,
ultimately holding that a challenge on that ground could be made only in the original
court. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider whether, or how far, Epstein cuts
back on Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), which permitted such an attack.
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because they could examine the settlement's terms. Any earlier proxy
solicitation would tend to resemble a beauty contest between rival coun-
sel, at which the relative credentials of the competing counsel would be
the principal focus. Such beauty contests are likely to leave most small
claimants indifferent. Once a specific dollars-and-cents settlement offer
is on the table, however, class members will predictably show greater at-
tention to the settlement's terms and its impact on them.
Finally, a solicitation at this stage is more cost-efficient. Necessarily,
there will be a mailing to class members with regard to the proposed
settlement in order to satisfy the constitutional requirement of notice.
Typically, this mailing will occur after preliminary judicial approval of the
settlement, and the timing of this mailing could be structured to permit
the inclusion of relatively short rival statements by objecting counsel who
wished to pursue a rival class action (and a response by class counsel). To
be sure, disputes would regularly arise about the accuracy of the state-
ments made in these rival solicitations, but similar disputes occur in most
corporate proxy contests and are resolved within even more compressed
time schedules.
Although it seems likely that many small claimants will remain ra-
tionally apathetic, the most difficult problems in modern class actions
have arisen not in small claimant class actions, but in class actions involv-
ing a high variance in claim values: i.e., classes having both high value
and low value claims within the class. In such cases, the insurgent might
propose to represent only a proposed subclass whose interests it believed
were inadequately represented.
In truth, nothing similar to the foregoing proposal has ever been
attempted.' 43 Thus, even if this proposal would desirably enhance the
value of exit and induce competing counsel to credibly signal their loyalty
to their clients, it seems predictable that it, or anything similar that might
complicate the settlement process, is certain to face resistance and to be
dismissed by many as impractical. Three likely objections stand out and
deserve special attention.
143. On a number of occasions, class representatives in state court class actions have
sought to opt out from federal court class actions settlements (which would bind them),
both on their own behalf and for all fellow class members in the state proceeding.
Although federal courts have permitted the class representative to opt out as an individual,
they have uniformly rejected the attempt to extend this opt-out decision to their fellow
class members. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1998)
(stating that a class representative lacks the power to opt out an entire class without the
permission of individual members); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402,
412 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that attorneys for prospective class will be able to request
exclusion only from people who authorize them to do so); In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig.
(No. II), 186 F.R.D. 403, 439 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (determining that class representative
cannot opt out on behalf of entire class). Although these attempts might have permitted
exit into a viable state court class action, they were properly rejected because the class
representative has, and should have, no power to make the decision between competing
classes on behalf of class members. As here contemplated, the choice to opt out would be
on an individual basis.
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a. Are class members competent to decide? - This question poses a pre-
dictable but extremely paternalistic objection. Admittedly, ordinary class
members have little competence in evaluating the merits of a lawsuit, but
the level of complexity is not necessarily any higher than that found in
many SEC registration statements or proxy solicitations dealing with com-
plex issues of valuation or accounting. Moreover, in the typical class ac-
tion, the class members have relatively small amounts at stake, thus fur-
ther reducing the case for judicial paternalism. Even when the stakes are
high for the individual class member, that class member already has the
right to opt out today. This proposal only formalizes an alternative vehi-
cle into which this class member can opt, thereby enhancing choice, but
not creating it.
b. Will a swarm of contending solicitations produce Rube Goldberg-like com-
plexity and confusion? - If even a half-dozen rival counsel were to submit
proxy solicitations proposing either rival classes or subclasses, the system
would be unworkable, and the Balkanization of the class action would
arrive by simply another route. But several factors are likely to discipline
insurgent class counsel and make these rival solicitations the exception
rather than the rule. First, insurgent counsel could be required to pay
the reasonable costs of printing and mailing its proposal. This is precisely
how the SEC handles hostile proxy solicitations: The company typically
mails the insurgent's proxy statement but charges the insurgent its rea-
sonable expenses.1 44 Such an up-front cost should quickly screen out friv-
olous or underfunded class counsel. Second, rival counsel would have
little incentive to represent a small opt-in class, as they would be compen-
sated only out of their class's recovery. Hence, their solicitations would
logically be contingent on obtaining a sufficiently substantial share of the
class to make the litigation economically viable. This factor alone should
preclude "Balkanized" classes or a host of satellite classes. Third, the
court could refuse to certify the rival class if too few class members opted
in or if it believed the proposed subclass otherwise failed the tests of Rule
23.145 Finally, the court could simply and somewhat arbitrarily limit the
solicitations it would include in the basic class action mailing to a feasible
number (hypothetically, two or three at most), leaving others to contact
class members on their own if they wished. After all, there would seem to
be no First Amendment right implicated, as no public forum is involved.
c. Won't judicial hostility doom this proposal? - Judicial hostility is cer-
tainly to be expected, as this proposal would complicate and delay the
144. Rule 14a-7 of the Securities and Exchange Commission Rules addresses the
obligations of registrants regarding mail to security holders, and requires the issuer to
specify to the insurgent "[t]he estimated cost of mailing a proxy statement." See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-7(a) (1) (iii) (1999).
145. Rule 23(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a "numero[sity]"
requirement that must be satisfied before a class action can be certified. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a) (1). Hence, if only fifty or so individuals elect to opt in to this rival proposed class,
the court could refuse to certify it.
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current settlement process. Even if the court to whom the original settle-
ment was submitted would predictably be hostile to a class of opt-outs that
have fled the proposed settlement, that court would typically not be the
court that would preside over the trial or resolution of the insurgent opt-
in class.
146
Finally, the fundamental idea of a competitive solicitation, as here
advanced, does not necessarily require the use of a rival class. For exam-
ple, in the mass tort context, client choice might be best facilitated by
enhancing the ability of class members to choose on a continuing basis
between remaining in the class or electing to be represented on an indi-
vidual or consolidated basis by traditional personal injury attorneys. This
option would be particularly useful for the future claimant. If a mass tort
settlement gave future claimants the ability to opt out of the settlement
on a delayed basis at the point at which their medical condition deterio-
rated (for example, as of the time at which the asbestos-exposed class
member is diagnosed as having lunch cancer or mesothelioma), then
traditional plaintiffs' attorneys could continue to solicit the class, hoping
to cause individual class members to opt out at this point. Such a com-
petitive remedy deters collusion (for example, it should here deter de-
fendants from structuring inadequate settlements for future claimants
that failed to adjust adequately for the impact of inflation).
Ultimately, this proposal for utilizing competition and market forces
involves a basic policy choice: exit should be seen as a superior substitute
to loyalty (or "class cohesion" in the Court's parlance), at least over a
broad range of cases. Enhancing exit, as here proposed, is intended as a
basis for reducing the need to insist upon high (and possibly unattaina-
ble) levels of class cohesion. As earlier noted, if Amchem and Ortiz are
read literally, subclassing may be required whenever a material difference
exists within the proposed class in terms of the injuries suffered or
strength of the legal claims possessed by class members. Enforced strictly,
such a requirement could eclipse the role of the class action in a variety
of areas where it provides the only potential remedy for small claimants.
In this light, this Article is therefore proposing a refinement on
Amchem and Ortiz's teachings: While "adequate representation" is a pre-
146. An opt-out class would be vulnerable indeed if it had to go to trial before the
same judge who approved the settlement that its members had earlier rejected. Yet, under
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998), the
transferee court that receives the class action by order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation may not retain it for trial, but must refer the case back to the original
jurisdiction from which the action was transferred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). Thus, in the
typical case where multiple class actions are consolidated by the Judicial Panel for purposes
of pre-trial discovery, the transferee court before whom the various actions are
consolidated will evaluate the proposed settlement, but if an opt-in class is formed by those
who have opted out of the original settlement, this action will eventually have to be
transferred back to its original jurisdiction prior to trial. Effectively, this means that the




requisite before a class action can be certified or absent class members
may be bound by the judgment, "adequacy" is not self-defining. What
constitutes adequate representation should depend in significant mea-
sure upon the effectiveness of the right to exit possessed by the class
member. Much less should need to be shown to demonstrate adequate
representation where there is an effective exit than where the class is a
mandatory one from which exit is not permitted. More specifically,
where the class member is given a fully-disclosed choice as to whether to
participate in a potentially overbroad class or to opt into a narrower sub-
class, there is substantially less reason to find that differences in the legal
strength of the claims held by class members deprived them of adequate
representation when one counsel represents all members of the class.
The specifics of this proposal will be discussed further in the next
section, but the immediately relevant point here is that if courts face a
choice between permitting rival solicitations or requiring elaborate sub-
classing, they may find the former to be the more attractive option.
III. THE COSTS OF REFORM: THE RISKS OF BALKANIZATION
AND HOLDOUTS
As earlier noted, Amchem and Ortiz connect adequacy of representa-
tion to an ideal of class cohesion, using the predomina[nce] requirement
of Rule 23(b) (3) as a partial justification for requiring that the class rep-
resentative meet a higher standard than that imposed by the traditional
"typicali[ity]" requirement of Rule 23(a) (3).147 The need for a higher
standard in some contexts is easily understood and both Amchem and Or-
tiz seem obviously correct on their facts. But insisting on "class cohesion"
may not be the reform best suited to the problems that Amchem and Ortiz
accurately assess. Indeed, if the standard for subclassing were to become
that class members must be placed into separate subclasses whenever ma-
terial differences existed between their injuries or legal positions, the sur-
vival of the class action would be imperilled as a means of asserting claims
that were infeasible to litigate on an individual basis.
In short, to the extent that Amchem's concept of class cohesion is
defined to require identicality, the class action becomes threatened. On
the other hand, unless subclassing with separate counsel is required in
Amchem-type cases, class counsel will remain able to make highly discre-
tionary allocations of the settlement among class members without their
express consent. Applied across the board, subclassing could be a rem-
edy worse than the disease. Ultimately, this dilemma frames a line draw-
ing problem: When is subclassing truly needed?
To reach an acceptable compromise, this Article will suggest three
basic rules by which to address the allocation issue that Amchem and Ortiz
have obliquely raised but not clearly resolved. First, in the context of
what this Article will call "negative value" class actions, differences in the
147. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
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legal position or claim strength of class members need not be viewed as
sufficiently material to require subclassing. Second, where the settlement
does treat class members in a materially different fashion but class coun-
sel has no external conflict, an effective right of exit plus the failure of
the class member to opt out after notice should be viewed as implicit
consent to this allocation. What constitutes an effective right of exit re-
quires, however, careful definition, and it will be suggested that the right
to exit may be effective in some contexts only if rival solicitations for an
opt-in class are permitted. Third, in the case of the mandatory or non-
opt-out class action, Amchem should be read strictly to require a very high
level of cohesion bordering on identicality.
A. The Negative Value Class Action
Both Amchem and Ortiz involved classes in which the variance in in-
jury and economic damages among class members was extreme. Some
class members were suffering from lung cancer and mesothelioma and
had only a short time to live, while others had only relatively minor pleu-
ral scars caused by exposure to asbestos and were asymptomatic. In such
a class that includes both high value claims and low value claims, an obvi-
ous problem surrounds class counsel allocating the settlement among
class members. Because one counsel simply cannot fairly represent all
the contending sides in the inevitable contest for a larger share of the
settlement, the legitimacy of such a conflicted counsel (or a team of such
counsel) agreeing on an allocation without bargaining between sub-
classes was properly rejected in both Amchem and Ortiz. Nor is the situa-
tion necessarily improved if all the class members receive the same
amount so as to avoid any explicit allocation. Ortiz effectively disposed of
this possibility by finding that the use of a post-settlement arbitration pro-
cedure to allocate the settlement fund also amounted to an allocation
decision. 148 In effect, treating unequal cases equally amounts to a prefer-
ence for the weak claims over the strong claims and thus demonstrates
inadequate representation of the strong claims.
149
Yet, if allocations are impermissible in high variance class actions, it
does not logically follow that allocations cannot be made in other cases
where the variance is lower. Take, for example, a hypothetical class ac-
tion brought against an insurance company which has overcharged
100,000 customers somewhere between $10 and $20 each per year over a
period of years. Presumably, if the amount of the overcharge can be cal-
culated on an individual basis, it would not offend Amchem to pay each
customer the actual amount of their overcharge. Nor should paying each
customer fifty percent of the asserted overcharge be viewed as an imper-
missible allocation, as most settlements usually occur at some discount off
148. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2320 (1999) ("The very decision
to treat them all the same is itself an allocation decision ... .
149. Id. at 2319-20.
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the maximum alleged damages. But now assume that this challenged
practice has continued for a series of years, and there is uncertainty as to
the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs assert that a six-year statute
applies, and defendants assert that a three-year statute cuts off the claims
of class members. A further complication is that some class members
were only insured by the defendant during this legally ambiguous three-
to six-year period, while other class members have only been insured for
the last three years, and still others for all six years. Assume finally that
defendants are prepared to settle for $10,000,000, based on paying $6 a
year for claims in the one- to three-year period, but only $4 a year for
claims in the four- to six-year period. Although all class members have
suffered the same economic injury, the legal strength of their claims obvi-
ously varies. If subclassing were required, it would vastly compound the
costs and difficulty of resolving this relatively small class action.
But how can subclassing be avoided? Even if the settling parties were
to agree to pay all class members $5 per year, this tactic would arguably
still offend Ortiz's prohibition on treating unequals equally. Thus, the
simplest and most candid answer is to allocate the settlement based on
each claimant's relative legal strength, and defend this allocation on the
basis that on these facts the difference is immaterial. One key difference
between this hypothetical class action and the facts of Amchem and Ortiz is
that these small claims could not be asserted on an individual basis. That
is, these are "negative value" claims because the transaction costs in estab-
lishing and collecting them are greater than the potential recovery. As a
result, "class cohesion" (in Amchem's phrase) exists, because all class
members presumably share a common preference for some recovery over
no recovery.
At first glance, this argument may sound like precisely the justifica-
tion rejected in Amchem and Ortiz that the class's common interest in the
fairness of the settlement alone satisfied the "predominance test" of Rule
23(b) (3).150 But the issue here is representational adequacy, not pre-
dominance. Presumably, on the foregoing facts, predominance could be
easily shown. Moreover, in Amchem, the differences between the amounts
to be received by high value claims and low value claims were material,
and in Ortiz, the failure to recognize the material difference in claim
strength was the decision that the Court said amounted to an impermissi-
ble allocation. In short, neither Amchem nor Ortiz should be read as for-
bidding immaterial allocations.
But what then should the standard of materiality be in this context?
After all, although the absolute difference between $6 and $4 in this hy-
pothetical is small, the percentage difference is 50% (i.e., the strong
claimants here receive 50% per year more than the weak claimants).
Here, Ortiz considered a useful test, which it ultimately declined to re-
solve: Transaction cost savings may justify some relaxation of the rules
150. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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and some difference in treatment if strict compliance would clearly make
everyone worse off.15 1 In Ortiz, the settling parties claimed that the trans-
action cost savings from use of the mandatory class action procedure justi-
fied their conflicted settlement. 152 The District Court had estimated
these savings at "hundreds of millions"1 5 3 and noted that they exceeded
Fibreboard's net worth. 15 4 The Supreme Court acknowledged that this
argument raised "at least a legitimate question, which we leave for an-
other day,"' 55 but still found the conflicts too numerous and too material
to permit the settlement to stand.
This transaction cost justification makes greater sense in the context
of deciding when an allocation by a counsel representing multiple clients
should be permissible. Although the alleged transaction cost savings in
Ortiz would have accrued to the defendants (who in theory could then
have afforded to pay a portion of them to the class), the savings that
would result in the foregoing hypothetical from avoiding the use of sub-
classes directly reduces the expenses of the class action (which are nor-
mally subtracted from the settlement fund). Essentially, the proposed ex-
ception to the prohibition on allocations can be operationalized as
follows: Do the cost savings from avoiding subclassing exceed the differ-
ential between the amounts paid to the two groups? Typically, these cost
savings will consist of the cost of additional counsel and possibly the cost
of more elaborate notice.
Basic common sense underlies this proposed interpretation of
Amchem and Ortiz. In high variance class actions (as those cases were),
subclassing is a necessary response to the obvious conflicts of interest that
often disable counsel. But in the classic small claimant class action where
the option of individual litigation does not exist as a practical matter,
subclassing is a remedy that may be worse than the disease. In the forego-
ing hypothetical involving small proposed individual recoveries of $4 and
$6, no class member truly benefits from insisting upon separate counsel
who will bargain over the $2 difference (and possibly increase it to $2.50
or decrease it to $1.50). Whether the consequence of adding additional
counsel to bargain over this margin is to increase or narrow it, everyone is
worse off if the additional transaction costs exceed the gain to the side
whose position is improved. Such an outcome is Pareto inferior, and no
rational policy should impose it on the class.
156
151. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2321-22 ("One great advantage of class action treatment
of mass tort cases is the opportunity to save the enormous transaction costs of piecemeal
litigation ....").
152. See id.
153. Id. (citing Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 529 (E.D. Tex. 1995)).
154. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2322. It specifically found that Fibreboard's estimated net
worth "is considerably less than the likely savings in defense costs under the Global
Settlement." Id. (citing Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 529).
155. 119 S. Ct. at 2322.
156. Ortiz expressly recognizes that "at some point there must be an end to
reclassification with separate counsel." Id. at 2320. But it does not offer any guidance as to
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Some limits on allocations are necessary, however, even in the con-
text of "negative value" class actions. Suppose a conflicted or simply lazy
counsel agreed to a settlement under which one subgroup would receive
ten dollars and the other only one dollar or zero. 15 7 Now, the proposed
transaction cost savings standard provides some actual protection. As-
sume that the $9 difference in amounts paid to the two subgroups comes
to $9 million in the aggregate. This would clearly exceed the cost of us-
ing separate counsel, and thus makes the allocation impermissible.
Equally important, such a standard is reasonably quantifiable and thus
eliminates legal uncertainty over whether the settlement can be ap-
proved, thereby informing the settling parties in advance what the legal
ground rules are.
B. Implied Consent to Allocations: Wen Is Exit an Effective Substitute?
At bottom, allocations that are "unbargained for" are impermissible
under Amchem and Ortiz essentially because the clients have not con-
sented to their conflicted attorney making the allocation. But, the law
can sometimes infer consent. Thus, the relevant policy question becomes
when it is appropriate to do so. At one extreme, plaintiffs' counsel might
argue that implied consent should be found in any opt-out class action
where class members fail to opt out after notice. Amchem probably fore-
closes this overbroad argument, however, because its facts involved an
opt-out class action in which it was feasible for at least those class mem-
bers with present injuries to opt out.
1. Future Claimants. - It seems axiomatic that a current right to exit
will never be an effective substitute for "class cohesion" in the case of
future claimants because they do not yet know whether they have been
injured-or how severely. Absent such knowledge, they cannot know
into which cell in the typical settlement grid they will fall or whether that
cell undercompensates them. In the typical case, the future claimants
may have a low base expectancy rate of incurring future illness and must
wait out a latency period that can stretch for decades. Thus, even rational
future claimants will act as if they were indifferent.
But consider now an alternative settlement structure under which
the class member has the right to opt out for some continuing period
after the class member's condition matures from mere exposure into any
of a series of progressively more serious injuries. Thus, while the class
member will receive, say, only $5,000 for the mere fact of exposure, the
class member becomes entitled to $300,000 if the class member later de-
velops lung cancer and also acquires the right to opt out from the class
where this limit might lie. This transaction cost standard is intended to provide a feasible
benchmark.
157. These are in a sense the facts of Amchem where some claims would have been
waived without any compensation.
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for six months after a diagnosis of lung cancer is made. 158 Under this
proposal, a new right to opt out is triggered at exactly the same point as
the class member develops a compelling interest in evaluating his or her
legal position. Under these conditions, exit seemingly becomes an effec-
tive functional substitute for class cohesion-at least if the legal claim has
a sufficiently high value that the exiting class member can reasonably ex-
pect to secure individual representation on a contingent fee basis. In
contrast, opting out should not be seen as a viable option in the case of a
"negative value" class action, where individual representation is not
feasible.
Such a delayed opt-out might deter some settlements, largely be-
cause defendants could not be certain as to the number of future opt-outs
and might fear that those who did opt out would predictably have high
valued claims. Yet, the settlements so deterred would disproportionately
be those that defendants had the greatest reason to expect to be inade-
quate for the class members. In general, defendants are far better posi-
tioned than individual class members or class counsel to make informed,
actuarial predictions about the likely future rate of serious illness (which
is the precondition for delayed opting out). They thus possess a form of
asymmetric information, which they signal when they reject a settlement
that contains a delayed opt-out feature. Moreover, defendants are also
better positioned to deal with the problem of delayed opt-outs by
purchasing liability insurance to cover their future obligations in respect
of such opt-outs. Indeed, defendants' inability to purchase such insur-
ance is a signal that they have been unable to convince their insurers that
the settlement is sufficiently fair to future claimants as to keep most
within the class. If the insurer thinks the liability is sufficiently great as to
make the insurance too expensive for the defendant, this implies that the
insurer, as a relatively disinterested observer, believes that class members
who incur future illness will be dissatisfied with the settlement's terms
and will reject the settlement's certain recovery for the riskier course of
individual litigation.
2. Exit to a Rival Class: Competition as a Solution. - Assume now that
the proposed class consists only of present claimants, who disagree vocif-
erously about the fairness of a proposed class action settlement. For ex-
ample, assume a securities class action involving securities purchased at
different time periods during which a series of allegedly false statements
158. This hypothetical in many respects mirrors the recent $4.75 billion settlement
entered into by American Home Products with respect to "Fen-phen" claims. Some six
million Americans have been exposed to "Fen-phen" (the popular name for two drugs
containing Fenfluramine, which was prescribed to treat obesity but which apparently
caused heart valve damage). Under the pending settlement, class members receive three
separate opportunities to opt out: (1) immediately before the plan is approved; (2) after a
test shows any heart valve damage; or (3) even after they qualify for a compensation
payment. See Susan Borreson, Fen-Phen Plan Doesn't Thrill Texans; Most Plaintiff




were made. Those who purchased during time period A will receive
eighty percent of their losses, while those who purchased during time
period B will receive only forty percent of their losses (on the theory that
the market already knew much of the adverse information). Objections
to the proposed settlement are received from class members who
purchased during this second time period (but not from those who
purchased during the first time period). Given that the difference in the
amounts to be received is material, this two-to-one allocation of the settle-
ment cannot be defended as immaterial (nor are these claims necessarily
"negative value claims").
Here, however, exit may also sometimes be a fair substitute for sub-
classing. Assume that the court indicates that it would certify an opt-in
class of investors who purchased in the second time period if sufficient
investors choose to opt in. This message is included in the notice mailed
to the class in connection with the original proposed settlement. In fact,
only a handful of investors choose to opt out of this new class action (and
they are too few to satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule
23 (a)(1)). 159 On this basis, the small number of opt-outs in the face of a
clear alternative might appropriately be taken as an indication of implied
consent by investors who purchased during the latter period. In short,
implied consent can be fairly inferred when there is a real choice, but not
when the only choice is Hobson's choice.
Even if the proposed class can be certified, one of the major attrac-
tions of this approach is that it does not produce a "dueling" class action
or raise the prospect of a "reverse auction." 160 This is because the two
class actions do not preempt each other. A release given by the plaintiffs'
attorney on behalf of the class in the first action does not apply to the
claims of those who have opted out; nor can any resolution of the second
opt-in class action affect the first action. Thus, at a stroke, one obtains
the advantages of competition and increases the choices available to the
class members-without increasing the risks of collusion. Class counsel
in the first action is disciplined (because opt-outs will predictably reduce
their fee award), but they are not forced into a race to settle.
Effectively, this approach uses exit to promote loyalty, and recognizes
that they are partial substitutes for each other. Accordingly, as next dis-
cussed, the level of representational adequacy that is required in an opt-
out class action in which the right to exit is enhanced should be lower
159. Rule 23(a) (1) specifies that before a class action may be certified the court must
find that "the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impracticable." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a) (1). While no fixed number is recognized for this purpose, classes of fewer
than 50 members are relatively uncommon. One commentator has suggested that a
presumption in favor of numerosity should commence at the level of 40 class members.
See 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 3.05, at 3-25 (3d ed. 1992) (cited in Mullen v. Treasure
Chest Casino, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999)).
160. For a discussion of the "reverse auction" problem (and the coining of this term),
see Coffee, supra note 1, at 1370-72.
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than in a mandatory class action (such as Ortiz) where exit is forbidden.
Reasonable persons can disagree about the specific tradeoffs, but this Ar-
ticle's central claim is that the legitimacy of such tradeoffs must be
acknowledged.
C. The Mandatory Class Action
Class cohesion is not a self-defining concept. How much cohesion is
needed logically should depend on whether the class member has a right
to exit. Hence, a more rigorous definition of class cohesion should apply
in the case of the mandatory class action where the class member is essen-
tially being coerced into participation.
But can one realistically expect courts to give class cohesion different
meanings in different contexts? The simple answer is that some courts
have already done so. In Barnes v. American Tobacco Co.,161 the Third Cir-
cuit was faced with a Rule 23(b) (2) class action against the major tobacco
companies based on a cause of action for medical monitoring, an equita-
ble remedy. Although the class was clearly as broad and diverse as was the
class in Amchem, plaintiffs' counsel argued that because Rule 23(b) (2)
does not require any showing of predominance, Amchem's requirement of
cohesiveness-which seemingly rested on the predominance require-
ment-did not apply. Looking past the precise wording of Amchem, the
Third Circuit properly said that cohesiveness is a requirement in all class
actions.162
Then the court added that a mandatory class action, such as a Rule
23(b)(2) class, "may require more cohesiveness than [a] (b)(3) class.
This is so because in [a] (b) (2) action, unnamed members are bound by
the action without the opportunity to opt out."163 This logic not only
makes good normative sense, but it supplies the necessary deterrent to
prevent the misuse of Rule 23(b) (1) and (b) (2) class actions as a means
of evading the greater procedural protections built into Rule 23 (b) (3).164
D. Holdouts
A final disadvantage of subclassing is that it encourages holdouts:
namely, persons or subgroups who are opportunistically seeking to obtain
a disproportionate share of the settlement because of their ability to delay
or withhold consent. The facts of Lazy Oil underscore this problem, be-
161. 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d
894, 897-900 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a right to opt out must be granted in any class
action for more than incidental damages).
162. Barnes, 161 F.3d at 142 ("the cohesiveness requirement... extends beyond Rule
23(b) (3) class actions").
163. Id. at 142-43 (citing Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 248-49 (3d
Cir. 1975) and Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 72 F.R.D. 619, 628 (E.D. Pa. 1976)).
164. Not only does Rule 23(b) (3) require predominance and superiority (unlike Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions), but it also expressly requires notice and permits opt
outs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
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cause there the dissident plaintiff class members were attempting to cer-
tify a subclass of oil-producing "professionals" who were distinguishable
from the other class members in that they actively operated oil companies
and were not simply passive investors. 16 5 Had such a subclass been certi-
fied, it seems likely that the "professionals" would have sought a larger
proportion of the settlement-even though nothing entitled them to a
larger share. That is, their distinctive status implied no special damages
that they had uniquely experienced. In general, the more subclasses that
are required, the greater the danger that one subclass will hold out-
either because that subclass senses that it can exploit the situation (be-
cause others are more eager to settle than it is) or because it has made an
unrealistic assessment of the relative strength of its legal claims.
In this light, the realistic policy choice is between two options: (1)
the use of subclasses to achieve a bargained-for allocation of the settle-
ment, or (2) offering a competing alternative (whether as an opt-in class
or individual or consolidated litigation into which the dissidents could
elect), thereby allowing the other class members to settle with the defend-
ants. The key problem with subclassing is that it encourages holdouts
and thereby invites tacit extortion. Most of the time, one simply cannot
tell if an objector truly views the settlement as inadequate or is rather a
potential holdout seeking to negotiate a larger share of the settlement for
itself. In this light, the case for the opt-in class is essentially that it solves
the holdout problem by forcing the holdout to elect-in the presence of
a realistic choice-whether it truly wishes to take the high-risk step of
rejecting the settlement. Concededly, the case against the opt-in class is
that it may discourage defendants from settling at all if they cannot
achieve a global settlement. Yet, by dividing the class and permitting
those dissatisfied with the proposed settlement to migrate to a separate
opt-in class, client autonomy is preserved, and some settlements may be
achieved that would be blocked if a single subclass could veto them.
Thus, the net effect on the settlement rate is simply indeterminate.
CONCLUSION
This Article's specific proposals can reasonably be debated, but its
more important claim is that a new framework is needed to assess class
actions and the recurring accountability problems to which they give rise.
Because the class counsel is more than simply a fiduciary, but rather is a
joint venturer with the class, a fixation with fiduciary principles alone pro-
duces a myopic tunnel vision. Not only does a strictly fiduciary analysis
misunderstand the position of class counsel, it also misconceives the in-
terests of class members. In truth, there is seldom a single best solution
for all class members, because their preferences and taste for risk neces-
sarily differ. Viewed instead as an organization, the class action can and
should be disciplined and monitored by a variety of market-based and
165. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 100:370
CLASS ACTION A CCOUNTABILITY
legal mechanisms. The critical difference between the fiduciary-based ap-
proach and the market-based approach is that the former implicitly tends
to assume that professionals should make litigation decisions for clients
(who are, after all, their wards), while the latter views the client as a con-
sumer, whose informed choice should both be expanded and respected.
From a normative standpoint, this Article has advanced the idea that
client autonomy should be a central goal of class action reform. Ex-
panding client choice-either by facilitating exit or by authorizing an
overlapping, opt-in class action so that class members can choose their
litigation goals-promotes this end. Client autonomy does not, of
course, trump other values across all contexts. But in these other, more
specialized contexts (such as institutional reform litigation), where incon-
sistent outcomes are unacceptable,1 66 the alternative is to rely on voice,
not exit. Nowhere should the governing principle be that of "profession-
als-know-best" (which is the de facto principle today across all class action
contexts).
Clearly, however, any movement toward greater voice or exit (or any
other principles of legitimacy) will predictably be resisted by those profes-
sionals (both counsel and trial judges) whose discretion it would reduce.
From an agency cost perspective, this resistance should not be surprising;
corporate managers did not rush to embrace the hostile takeover or
proxy rule reform. Yet both reforms have come, and managerial account-
ability has been enhanced. Indeed, the goal of client autonomy-which
includes protecting the absent individual from submergence in a larger
entity that does not truly share that individual's goals or preferences-
seems the one thread that unites Amchem and Ortiz with earlier Supreme
Court decisions, such as Hansberry v. Lee167 and Martin v. Wilks. 168
Although both Amchem and Ortiz are written narrowly by majorities that
sometimes seem obsessively focused on the language of Rule 23 and un-
willing to look beyond it, they are consistent with the Court's long-stand-
ing concern that absent class members (or others) not be bound by a
disloyal representative.
166. The simplest example is the traditional school desegregation suit involving a
metropolitan-wide area. Defendants might propose a settlement that involves no
mandatory busing across prior school lines, but instead adds millions of dollars to the
school budgets in the de facto segregated area. Some parent groups might prefer the
approach that improves educational opportunity to the more symbolic remedy of
integration; others would not. The point is that client autonomy cannot be the answer in
this context, because the two settlement proposals (busing versus money) are mutually
exclusive. But even in this context, it does not follow that the plaintiffs' attorneys should
have the discretion to choose the preferred solution. See Bell, supra note 39. Instead, a
more democratic approach to ascertaining the views of class members is needed; still, this
topic of how to enhance voice is beyond this Article's ambitions.
167. 311 U.S. 32, 42-43, 45 (1940) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires that
the named plaintiff must always adequately represent the interests of absent class
members).
168. 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (holding that people are entitled to "[their] own day in
court" to challenge actions taken under a consent decree to which they were not a party).
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Reforms have costs as well as benefits. In particular, an exclusive
focus on representational adequacy could result in the dismantling of the
class action as the one feasible solution to the collective action problems
that arise in litigating small claims individually. For this reason, this Arti-
cle has urged that greater attention be given to alternative means to the
same end: namely, greater reliance on "exit" and "voice." On the spe-
cific policy level, this Article has predicted that exit should outperform
voice, at least when the litigation is intended to result in money damages.
In part, this is because voice produces coercive, majoritarian solutions in
a context in which individual solutions may be more just because the taste
for risk is extremely subjective and personal. In contrast, exit facilitates
individual choice and can be implemented through market-driven
remedies.
Representational adequacy must, of course, be part of any solution,
but this Article has argued that it can be carried too far. The Balkaniza-
tion of the class action is a realistic prospect, and defendants have every
incentive to hasten its arrival in order to preclude class certification. To
the extent that subclassing is necessary (as it certainly is in the mass tort
context), the test of the adequate representative should focus more on
the representative's negotiating leverage and incentive to maximize the
subclass's recovery than on any idealized concept of class cohesion. A
cohesive subclass means little if the subclass counsel's incentives are to
achieve an aggregate settlement, even at high cost to the subclass. Only a
rule that compensates the counsel to the subclass exclusively out of the
recovery to the subclass guards against this danger.
Although many reforms are possible and could succeed, only one is
sure to fail: reliance on trial court scrutiny of the settlement. 169 Tradi-
tionally, this has been the Bar's response to demonstrated instances of
class action abuse, but such a prescription of closer judicial involvement
seems likely only to preserve the status quo. Appellate courts can im-
prove the status quo by a variety of means: by requiring subclassing, by
restricting limited fund and settlement classes, by encouraging greater
negotiation between class counsel and economically substantial class rep-
resentatives (such as the lead plaintiff in securities class actions), and by
permitting easier exit. All make sense in moderation. But the limits on
feasible reform also need to be understood: Too much medicine and the
169. The principal policy recommendation made in the RAND Study is that "Judges
Need to Scrutinize Settlements More Closely." RAND Study, supra note 1, at 32. Although
this would be normatively desirable, it is vacuous as a policy proposal because it ignores the
strong incentives for the court to approve a settlement, the limited information available to
the court, and the even more fundamental problem that there may be no single best
settlement for all class members. To believe that there is one best solution is to fall prey to
the "one size fits all" fallacy. Although the RAND Study does make other proposals
involving fee awards that are useful (and have been made before), the inadequacy of its
prescriptions reminds us that empirical research alone cannot resolve the problem of class
action accountability. Even first-rate empirical scholarship does not provide the
theoretical basis for policy prescription. Sound policy must rest on a sound theory.
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patient dies; too much reform, and the class action could become an en-
dangered species.
Exit, voice, and loyalty have different costs and produce different
benefits. Recognizing them as potential functional substitutes represents
the rational first step toward reducing the agency costs of class action
governance.
